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NOTES
Prosecuting the "Fog of War?"'
Examining the Legal Implications of
an Alleged Massacre of South Korean
Civilians by U.S. Forces During the
Opening Days of the Korean War in
the Village of No Gun Ri
ABSTRACT

In the Fall of 1999, the Associated Press reported a story
of an alleged massacre of Korean civilians, conducted by U.S.
troops at the beginning of the Korean War in the hamlet of No
Gun Ri. The story had an incendiary effect, both in the
United States and abroad. The story of an incidentfrom halfa-century ago caused many to reexamine the conduct of
American forces in that war, the current security
arrangements in East Asia, the U.S.-R.O.K. relationship, and
the wisdom and ability of modem Americans to investigate,
evaluate, and judge historical events from our current
historicaland culturalperspective.
Internationallaw has developed a detailed body of law
dealing with war crimes through the Nuremberg Charterand
the Geneva Conventions. Prosecution of war criminals by
International Tribunals has been nearly non-existent since
the end of the Second World War. Internationallaw appears
to eliminate the defense of "superiororders," but U.S. military
law is not so clear. It seems highly doubtful that the United

1.
The Prussian strategist of the Napoleonic Era, Karl Von Clausewitz is
often credited with introducing the concept of "the fog of war." The "fog of war"
refers to the constant "uncertainty" that develops due to a lack of complete data,
inaccurate information, and the frequent "friction" or chaos that results from a
partial picture, the rapid pace of modem combat, and the unquantifiable human
factors. KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, VoM KRIEGE [ON WAR] 51-53, 75 (O.J. Matthijs
Jolles trans., Random House Modem Library Edition 1943) (1832). Clausewitz is
considered required reading at all the service war colleges, and his insight has
been seen as critical for operational planning by military commanders. In fact, ON
WAR "became the Rosetta Stone for the post-Vietnam military." Col. Harry G.
Summers, Jr., Foreward to KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, WAR, POLITICS, AND POWER:
SELECTIONS FROM ON WAR, AND I BELIEVE AND PROFESS, at ix (Edward M. Collins
trans., Regnery Publ'g 1997) (1965).
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States would allow an internationalbody to determine the
fates of any accused in this incident.
This note seeks to investigate the tangle of U.S. military
law, Internationallaw, andpolitical calculationsthat must be
considered in developing a solution to the No Gun Ri
Massacre. It also reviews the evidence and the on-going
investigations as they currently stand. Finally, it offers
suggestionsfor what the government should do if and when
it determines that the situation has moved from mere
allegationsto verifiablefacts.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Reprehensible conduct by military forces that could be
considered criminal and thereby a war crime 2 was an all too
common event during the past century, and seems to continue
with frequency into this new one. For example, in Chechnya
earlier this year, Russian forces apparently undertook a ruse that
blatantly violated the Hague Convention,3 promising Chechen
fighters safe passage out of Grozny, but instead directing them
into a minefield (apparently killing hundreds) and opening fire on
4
the survivors.
"It would be idle to deny that many incidents of gross and
'grave breaches"' of the international law governing conduct in
civil and international armed conflicts have occurred since the
adoption of the Geneva Convention in 1950. s Indeed, outside the
ad hoc war crime tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, there have been no international attempts to prosecute
war criminals. 6 The prosecution of those accused of war crimes
have been treated, if at all, by national courts as violations of

2.
A war crime "means an act that remains criminal even though
committed in the course of war, because it lies outside the area of immunity
prescribed by the laws of war." See Telford Taylor, War Crimes, in WAR, MORALITY,
& THE MILITARY PROFESSION 365, 366 (Malham M. Wakin ed., 1986) (General
Telford Taylor served as the American Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg). For
discussion of the laws of war see infra notes 202-223 and accompanying text.
3.
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague,
IV), Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23, TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1949, U.S. DEPT' OF STATE, PUB. No. 8407, 631, 648
(1968). Article 23(b) especially forbids forces to "kill or wound treacherously
individuals belonging to the hostile nation," and 23(f) forbids the improper use of
"a flag of truce."
4.
World News Tonight: Russian commanders say they are in control of
Grozny (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 4, 2000). "The Russians were boasting
about what they did." Id. "[A general said] We tricked them ... that[s] how the
question of Grozny was solved." Id. See also David Hoffman, New Evidence of
Russian Atrocities; Videotape Shows Mass Grave in Chechnya, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Feb. 26, 2000, at A15 ("The videotape showing the mass grave... many of
whom were bound and tied at the ankles ... was the latest in a string of claims
against Russian troops of war crimes and atrocities in the war against Chechen
separatists.").
5.
G.I.A.D. Draper, The Modem Pattern of War Criminality, in WAR CRIMES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 141, 159 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1996)
[hereinafter Draper].
6.
Timothy L.H. McCormack, From Sun Tzu to the Sixth Committee: The
Evolution of an International Criminal Law Regime, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 31, 62-63 (Timothy L.H. McCormack &
Gerry J. Simpson eds., 1997).
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Given the admittedly spotty enforcement of
state law. 7
international law or even national law in prosecuting suspected
war criminals over the last half century, why has there been such
international interest in an incident that if it occurred, took place
half a century ago during the opening days of the Korean War?
This paper will attempt to address this question, as well as
several others. In Part II, the historical record and the events at
Part III will examine the
No Gun Ri will be scrutinized.
jurisdiction of the military justice system. Part IV will determine
whether any crimes were committed at No Gun Ri under U.S. law,
and if so, which laws apply. In addition, Part IV will consider the
international agreements the United States is party to, and which
of these, if any, apply to this incident. Part V will discuss the socalled "Superior Orders" defense, a claim that can be anticipated
to be raised in any war crimes trial. Part VI will evaluate the
options available to the United States if the Army inspection team
currently investigating determines that war crimes occurred.
Finally, Part VII will offer this author's conclusions as to what
course the U.S. government should pursue, as well as the likely
outcome of this controversy.
II. WHAT HAPPENED AT No GUN RI?

Before examining the specific legal issues that a newly
discovered war crime would present at this time, several
questions must be addressed. First, why is there any interest in
events that if they occurred, did so some fifty years ago? Upon
establishing why such interest exists, we must next examine the
events that preceded the apparent massacre. No war crime is
must
and any investigation
committed spontaneously,
subjectively evaluate the time, place, manner, and events that led
Having
to the breach of national and international law.
of the
details
specific
the
the
incident,
for
the
context
established
episode can be appraised. Finally, this particular event has
generated dual investigations by the United States and South
Korean governments. The history of previous inquiries and the
current explorations will be examined in the conclusion of this
section.

Roger S. Clark, Nuremberg and Tokyo in Contemporary Perspective, in
7.
THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 171, 186-87
(Those national courts have also been asked to act in lieu of other states).
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Why Does this Matter, and Why is there Concern
Half a Century After these Alleged
Events Occurred?

Perhaps the primary reason that both the U.S. military and
government are interested in determining whether the alleged
events occurred, and whether U.S. forces were involved, is that if
this massacre took place, it was perpetrated by Americans. 8 This
country appears to take its burden of moral leadership as the
"world's sole remaining superpower" and most successful
democracy seriously, and consequently holds its military (both its
leaders and soldiers) to a higher standard of conduct than may be
expected of the Russians or others. Additionally, there is the
concern that the appearance of a cover-up by the U.S.
government could harm our relations with South Korea, or other
important allies. 9 The allegations of this war crime have been
widely reported by the press of nations friendly to the United
States, 10 and have been used for propaganda purposes by the
North Koreans" and others opposed 12 to the presence of the
United States in the region.

8.
Nightline: Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera Discusses Army's
Investigation into What Happenedat No Gun Ri (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 22,
1999). Secretary Caldera said the investigation was important because the
American government owed the public an explanation of what occurred. Id.
Transcript: Secretary of the Army Louis Cadera Holds Briefing on
9.
Events at No Gun Ri During the Korean War; DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REGULAR NEWS
BRIEFING, Washington, D.C. (Federal Document Clearing House Political
Transcripts, Sept. 30, 1999) [hereinafter FDCH Transcript].
10.
See, e.g., Sang-Hun Choe et. al., Bridge of Shame, TORONTO STAR, Sept.
30, 1999, at 1; U.S. Team Meets Korean-War Massacre Victims, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Oct. 29, 1999; Korean War Killing Inquiry, THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct.
30, 1999, at 17.
11.
See, e.g., The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), http://www.
kcna.co.jp/index/intro.htm (last visited December 21, 1999) ("The Korean Central
News Agency is the one and only state-run agency of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK). It speaks for the Workers' Party of Korea and the DPRK
government."). A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK claimed that
the South Koreans were engaged in a cover-up proving "the South Korean
authorities are pro-American flunkeyists and traitors who are not interested in the
Id. The spokesman
destinies of the nation and their fellow countrymen.
continued, "[w]e will square accounts with the U.S. for all their crimes against our
people and make them pay for the blood." Id. Additionally the KNCA reported
"mass uprisings" and "demonstrations" on numerous occasions throughout North
Korea protesting the alleged massacre, clearly demonstrating the totalitarian
regime's intent to use this incident for their own political purposes. Id.
Calvin Sims, South Koreans Call on U.S. to Apologize for Killings, N.Y.
12.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 1999, at A6. Protesters at the American military headquarters in
Seoul "said violence by United States soldiers in South Korea is not just a thing of
the past, but continues today." Id. The article also reported on calls for
prosecution of the No Gun Ri veterans by "[t]he Rev. Moon Bae Gol, director of a
group called the Committee to Stop Crime by the United States Military." Id.
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The motivation for the U.S. military in getting to the bottom
of the events at No Gun Ri likely stems from another incident that
occurred eighteen years after these alleged events. The incident,
known simply as My Lai, stands as a totem for a mass of horror,
recriminations, and distrust between the political leadership, the
military, and the public at large.' 3 On March 16, 1968, U.S.
soldiers engaged in wanton criminal conduct on an appalling
scale in which company-sized forces operating in a series of
hamlets in the village of Son My killed up to 504 Vietnamese
civilians. 14 This shameful incident is viewed as having "stained
the honor of the U.S. Army" and has affected senior leadership

13.
If the massacre at No Gun Ri was conducted by Americans it 'would
rank as the century's second deadliest . . . bloodbath . . . committed by U.S.
troops, trailing only the 1968 My Lai massacre in Vietnam, where G.I.s killed up
to 500 noncombatants." Mark Thompson, The Bridge at No Gun Ri: Did Panicky
American G.Ls Massacre Korean Civilians at the Beginning of the Korean War?,
TIME, Oct. 11, 1999, at 42.
14.
Companies generally consist of three platoons, each of which are made
up of between thirty and forty men. See LAWRENCE P. CROCKER, ARMY OFFICER'S
GUIDE 480-81 (45th ed. 1990). In the hamlet of My Lai, a platoon led by 2LT
William Calley, Jr. is alleged to have killed 347 people. NEIL SHEEHAN, A BRIGHT
SHINING LIE: JOHN PAUL VANN AND AMERICA IN VIETNAM 689 (1988). The Criminal
Investigative Division of the U.S. Army reported that another 90 villagers were
killed at a second hamlet by soldiers in another company of Calley's battalion, also
of the American Division that same day. Id. Some of the soldiers there that day
refused to participate in the atrocities. Id. Many were involved in the killing of
women, children, and the elderly. Id. They raped, beat, and killed some of their
victims. Id. They destroyed livestock, poisoned the hamlets' wells, and herded
many of the Vietnamese peasants into drainage ditches where they were gunned
down. Id. 2LT Calley was charged with personally killing 109 Vietnamese. Id.
Perhaps the only comfort that the military can take in the entire sickening
episode was that the investigation of the incident began through a letter written by
a recently discharged soldier, Ron Ridenhour. Stanley Bates, My Lai and Vietnam:
The Issues of Responsibility, in INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 191, 201
(Peter A. French ed., 2d rev. ed. 1998). His conscience would not allow the crime
to go uninvestigated. Id. Said Ridenhour:
I wanted to get those (responsible at My Lai) people. I wanted to reveal
what they did. My God, when I first came home, I would tell my friends
about this and cry-literally cry. As far as I was concerned, it was a
reflection on me, on every American, on the ideals that we supposedly
represent.
Id. Similarly, an American helicopter pilot, Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, Jr.,
landed at My Lai on March 16, and attempted to intervene and stop the killing.
DAVID L. ANDERSON, FACING MY LAI: MOVING BEYOND THE MASSACRE 10-11 (1998).
He notified his chain of command about the war crimes he witnessed, and
attempted to force an investigation through his report (though it was not acted
upon). Id. These few examples of personal courage in the face of such evil are
used as illustrations in current Army ethical training. Id.
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decisions, I5 the Army's training, 16 its policies such as the Rules
of Engagement, 17 and its culture.' 8 This incident has particularly
sensitized the military 19 to suggestions of wrongdoing, 20 and it
likely helps further explain the interest in fully investigating the
No Gun Ri incident, and may even indicate the military
21
investigators' willingness to recommend prosecutions.

15.

RICK ATKINSON, CRUSADE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

453 (1993). Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf had both served in the Americal
Division (the Division responsible for the My Lai massacre) during Vietnam and
they had internalized lessons from that failure of leadership. Id. They wished to
avoid any incident that could possibly be interpreted in such a light, nor did they
wish to place "aggressive young troops in proximity with potentially hostile
civilians." Id. This directly affected their decision-making on the pursuit of the
retreating Iraqi Army and destroying it in its retreat. Id.
16.
Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) training follows guidelines
set forth in Cadet Command Regulation 145-3 appendix D, as a training guide.
Letter from MAJ William R. Anderson, Executive Officer, College of William &
Mary, Revolutionary Guard Battalion, Army ROTC, to Christopher D. Booth (Feb.
22, 2000) (on file with author).
The program of instruction is currently
undergoing revision, but as it now stands cadets must complete six blocks of
ethics instruction: Apply Characteristics of Profession of Officer Service, Identify
Ways Values Affect Leader Obligations, Comply with Joint Ethics Regulation
Requirements, Create a Climate that Fosters Ethical Behavior, Apply the Just War
Tradition, and Resolve an Ethical Dilemma. Id. Additionally, two blocks of
leadership instruction have an ethical component: Enforce EO/Sexual
Harassment Program, and Comply with Code of Conduct in Combat Operations
and Captivity. Id. See also supra note 14; see generally MILITARY LEADERSHIP, FM
22-100 (1983); MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM: PLATOON AND SQUAD INSTRUCTION, TC 22-

9-1 (1986) (For Army manuals that address these types of issues and training).
17.
See generally Major Mark S. Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land
Forces:A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1994).
18.
FACING MY LAI, supra note 14, at 182 (quoting Gen. Walter Boomer,
U.S.M.C.). My Lai is a continuing topic of discussion in the military, and the
military believes it can never be forgotten or covered in just a few classes. Id.
19. Perhaps the most significant outcome of My Lai was the law of war
and its prohibitions against killing noncombatants became a constant
consideration in the minds of commanders. Few were likely to disregard
the breaches of that law and ignore the moral and legal responsibilities
they now understood themselves to carry. And cynics might add, neither
would they disregard the career-ending damage a cover-up, once
discovered, would wreck.
GARY D. SOLIS, SON THANG: AN AMERICAN WAR CRIME 59 (1997).
20.
See AL SANTOLI, LEADING THE WAY: How VIETNAM VETERANS REBUILT THE
U.S. MILITARY, AN ORAL HISTORY 119-28 (1993) ("[a]n important element of
rebuilding the Army was the integration of the study of ethics and philosophy of
leadership in Officer Training Courses").
21.
Great criticism was leveled at President Nixon and the U.S. Army for
not fully prosecuting those responsible for the My Lai massacre. Id. at 12. 2LT
Calley was the only soldier convicted of any crimes, and he served a total of four
and a half months in a military prison. Id. This limited and lenient treatment of
those involved was seen by many as a cover-up and a denigration of the military
justice system. Id.
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B. The SituationFaced by the American Army in Korea
During the Initial Weeks of Fighting Was One of
Chaos,Lack of ProperEquipment,
and NearPanic
At 4 a.m., on June 25, 1950, forces of the North Korean
People's Army (NKPA) crossed the 38th Parallel and began their
invasion of the Republic of (South) Korea. 2 2 By June 30th,
President Truman and his advisors concluded that the United
States would intervene with "any and all" ground forces required
23
to prevent a communist victory on the Korean peninsula. The
Eighth Army, consisting of four U.S. Army divisions conducting
garrison duty on the Japanese home islands, constituted the
available U.S. ground forces in the region. 2 4 Conservative
estimates put the Eighth Army at only "40 percent combat
effective" strength. 25 "The United States, following demobilization
from World War II, was in poor shape to go to war, especially in
Asia. What postwar planning there had been was for a global,
[nuclear
European, nuclear war; to many the development 2of
6
obsolete."
forces]
conventional
[rendered
had
weapons]
U.S. forces in Japan spent little time on training, and officers
were constantly faced with maintaining discipline due to the lax
attitude of many of the draftees that made up the occupying

22.

DONALD KNOX, THE KOREAN WAR: PUSAN TO CHOSIN, AN ORAL HISTORY 5

(1985).
23.
CLAY BLAIR, THE FORGOTTEN WAR: AMERICA IN KOREA 1950-1953 84-87
(1987).
Garrison duty in this case meant providing a U.S. presence in occupied
24.
Japan. Id. at 88. Soldiers were supposed to conduct training and maintain a
combat focus, but generally the forces maintained low readiness with most their
time spent on activities such as administration, parades, and other light activities.

Id.
25.
Id. "Combat effective" is not defined in this source. In modem Army
parlance, however, the concept is taken to be an assessment of the overall training
level of the unit, the condition of its equipment (which is further evaluated on the
basis of whether it has any "deadline deficiencies" meaning that it fails FM 10-20
standards for being able to perform at a Fully Mission Capable (FMC) level), and
the number of personnel it has measured against the number it has assigned in
The author is
its Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E).
conversant with this subject having served on active duty as an Army officer in a
variety of staff and troop positions in Armor, Cavalry, Aviation, and Headquarters
units stationed in Korea, the United States, and the Middle East, from 1994-1998.
Those experiences included: the compiling and reporting of unit evaluation reports
to Division level headquarters, assignments supervising and commanding Troop
level units responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of combat vehicles, the
management and accountability of supplies at Troop and Battalion level, and the
management of personnel at Troop and Battalion level.
26.
SWAFFORD JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE U.S. CAVALRY 181 (1985).

942

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

army. 2 7

The American soldiers were in

a

[Vol. 33:933

"state of psychic

disarmament" and were thus not properly prepared for combat. 28
The weapons and equipment they were issued were in many
cases inoperable, incompatible with other systems, or in other
ways non-functional. 2 9 For example, the 2.36 inch bazooka used
by U.S. troops was described by soldiers as a "piece of failed
[World War II] trash" that "gravediggers . .. often found ground
30
up in the bodies of GIs because it could not stop tanks."
The first U.S. forces to see combat were a hastily assembled
unit of 400 infantrymen named Task Force Smith. 3 ' This unit
had high morale, and bravely engaged a North Korean armored
force in the first U.S. action of the war on July 5th.3 2 Task Force
Smith suffered from all the problems endemic to U.S. forces as a
whole. For example, every 2.36-inch bazooka they fired at the
North Korean tanks was either a dud, or bounced ineffectively off
of the communist armor.33 Ultimately, this heroic road-block
attempt (facing odds of 20:1)34 was futile, with the Task Force
suffering over 185 men killed, captured, wounded, or missing,
while the North Koreans were at the most inconvenienced rather
than deterred in their advance. 35 The defeat of Task Force Smith
and the attendant rumors "ate like a cancer into the combat
morale" of U.S. forces landing in Korea that July, with many
soldiers worrying about the effectiveness of their equipment,
tactics 3 6 and chance of success against the NKPA. 3 7
The

27.
Problems included fighting, excess drinking, rampant venereal disease,
disobedience of lawful orders, soldiers chronically late for formation, and those
who chose to go AWOL (absent without leave). KNOX, supra note 22, at 9.
28.
Col. Carl F. Bernard, Commentary, Perspective on Warfare: We were a
Speed Bump for the North Koreans. If civilians were massacred at No Gun Ri, it
was by untrained and under-equipped U.S. soldiers under brutal assault, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 8,

1999, at B9.

29.
BLAIR, supra note 23, at 92. The equipment assigned to the 34th
Regiment of the 24th Division, was "a national disgrace." Id. "Between 25 and 50
percent of our small arms were unserviceable." Id.
30.
Bernard, supra note 28.
31.
KNox, supranote 22, at 13.
32.
BLAIR, supra note 23, at 101-03.
33.
KNOX, supra note 22, at 30.
34.
Col. David H. Hackworth, Making the Same Dumb Mistakes, NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 18, 1993, at 43.
35.
BLAIR, supranote 23, at 103.
36.
The Air Force, like the Army, suffered from a similar lack of training
and equipment. Id. at 99. Close air support (aircraft supporting ground forces)
was a low priority in the Air Force. Id. Task Force Smith received no assistance
from the Air Force, and its lack of preparations showed at the time. Id. For
example, on July 3, U.S. fighters bombed ROK (South Korean) forces at Pyongtaek
and Suwon, destroyed a ROK ammunitions train, the railroad depots at both
towns, half of Pyongtaek proper, and 30 ROK trucks. Id. Total casualties
exceeded 200 friendly forces killed. Id.
37.
Id.
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reprehensible situation that these initial forces faced left such a
lasting impression on the military3 8 that Army leaders of the
39
1990's preached the mantra of "no more Task Force Smiths."
The first weeks of the Korean War were disastrous for the
American forces. The end of the first week's combat found the
NKPA having advanced fifty miles, and the U.S. having suffered
3,000 casualties. 40 By July 22, the end of the second week in
Korea, the 24th Infantry Division (24th IN) could account for only
8,660 of its 15,965 men. 4 1 The 1st Cavalry Division (1CD) was
hastily assembled aboard a convoy of British and American
ships. 42 Initially the Eighth Army planned on using the division
for an amphibious landing, but the situation had deteriorated to
such an extent that they were disembarked at Pusan, where they
pushed forward to relieve the badly mauled 24th IN. 4 3 There they
began to assume blocking positions on July 22. 4 4 The 1CD was
perhaps in poorer shape than the 24th was when it initially
deployed to Korea. The division had only 11,000 soldiers of its
assigned strength of 18,500, and had lost 750 Non-commissioned
officers 4 S to fill-out the 24th when that division had first been
sent from Japan. 4 6 Additionally, many considered the division
leadership to be "too old" and to have little experience in leading
soldiers. Positions on the Division and regimental staffs were

38.
Hackworth, supra note 34. Hackworth compares the ambush of the
U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force commandos in the failed raid in Mogadishu,
Somalia in 1993, with the disaster of Task Force Smith. Id. Hackworth blames
the Clinton administration for poor planning, equipment, and leadership. Id.
Seventeen soldiers died, 77 were wounded, and one was taken prisoner in the
Somali firefight. Michael Elliot et. al., Bloodbath; What Went Wrong? The Making
of a Fiasco,NEWSWEEK, Oct. 18, 1993, at 32.
39.
Richard Lardner, The Glow Is Gone From the Army, AIR FORCE
MAGAZINE, Apr. 1994, at 62. The Army Chief of Staff Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan "is
determined that his troops be trained and ready for combat. He preaches that
there will be 'no more Task Force Smiths,' a grim reference to the ill-trained and
poorly supplied Army unit wiped out in the early days of the Korean War."
40.
BLAIR, supranote 23, at 115.
41.
Id. at 141.
42.
KNOX, supra note 22, at 63.
43.
By the second week of the war the 24th Division's own commanding
general had been captured by the NKPA, and two regiments had been completely
eliminated, with captured prisoners forced to broadcast statements over a
captured Seoul radio station. Bernard, supra note 28.
44.
Id.
45.
Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are often called "the backbone of the
Army" because of their critical role as leaders at the small unit level. LTC
CROCKER, supra note 14, at 274-75. These sergeants (and corporals) supervise
and direct the enlisted soldiers at the team, squad, and platoon level (granted this
is a superficial explanation and NCO's have a role at higher level organizations).
Id. Additionally, they serve as conduits for the commands of their commissioned
officers, and in many cases their greater experience allows them to make valuable
suggestions to their officers. Id.
46.
BLAIR, supra note 23, at 157.
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considered to be easy "going away presents" for senior officers
preparing to retire. 47
A sergeant in one of the battalions of the 1CD, described the
experience of his unit in its first week in Korea:
I lost a lot of kids-snipers, mortars, artillery. By the time we got to
Taegu, everybody was either withdrawing, in the hands of the
medics, or dead. Taegu had been bombed and shelled and was on
fire. There was no transportation for us. Trucks were full up
48
bringing back the dead.

The initial encounters by the division with the NKPA did not go
In heavy fighting e the NKPA
well for the Americans.
overwhelmed three of the four infantry battalions of the division
engaged on July 25th.5 0
The Second Squadron Seventh U.S. Cavalry (2/7) was a
typical 51battalion in the First Cavalry Division, made up of
"green" troops suffering the same problems that the other U.S.
forces experienced. 5 2 With a storied legacy dating back to its
service with Gen. George Custer in the 1870's, through service
against Pancho Villa in Mexico, and against the Japanese in the
Pacific, the 2/7 was not without its share of glory and historic
pedigree.5 3 The unit did not acquit itself well when "flung willynilly into battle" against the NKPA, where it buckled and began a
"chaotic withdrawal" on the 25th. 54 The entire division began to
retreat from the North Korean onslaught, and the mood could be
characterized as one of panic. Said one soldier, "The feeling was
that no one was accountable to anyone. It looked like it was
the time came, make
going to be every man for himself, and when
55
sure you got your [self] out in one piece."

47.

Id. at 159.

48.
KNOX, supra note 22, at 65.
As an example, artillerymen had to resort to fighting off North Korean
49.
attackers with their small arms, while firing their artillery pieces on fire missions.
BLAIR, supranote 23, at 159.
50.
Id.
51.
To be green means "marked by inexperience or immaturity; lacking
training, knowledge, or experience." WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 996 (3d ed.
1993).
Bernard, supranote 28.
52.
See generallyJOHNSON, supra note 26.
53.
54.
BLAIR, supranote 23, at 159 (quoting the 7th Cavalry's own historian).
55.
KNOX, supra note 22, at 68.
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C. The Specific Events that Apparently
Occurred
5 6
at No Gun Ri
It was under these circumstances that the 2/7 Cavalry found
itself in a little hamlet known as No Gun Ri. Panicked, 7 missing
119 of its 600 soldiers, and in some cases abandoning their
58
weapons during their first encounter with the North Koreans,
the battalion finally regrouped and began to take up defensive
positions in the vicinity of the village. 59 The records for H

56.
This author has attempted to establish a chronology of the events that
occurred based on a variety of secondary sources. Currently the U.S. Army's
Inspector General is conducting a formal investigation that is seeking to establish
what precisely occurred between July 26 and July 29, 1950. See infra notes 107118 and accompanying text (discussing the ongoing investigation).
Since the original publication of the AP's story, many people have investigated
the allegations. The accounts of several of the supposed eyewitnesses have been
examined. The story given by Ed Daily, widely quoted in many of the original
articles, was spectacularly debunked by the New York Times, who determined that
he was not in the 7th Cavalry at the time of the event, and had in fact falsified
much of his wartime record. See, e.g., Editorial, No Gun R" The Tricks of Memory,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jun. 18, 2000, at 2J; David Hughes, Editorial, The
Massacre That Never Was: Reports of Slaughterof Korean Civilians Don't Stand Up
to CloserInspection, DENV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jun. 11, 2000, at 1B.
This author, however, disputes the conclusion drawn by many of those
dismissing the existence of a massacre merely through the discrediting of a single
witness, or even casting doubt on all of the servicemen's memories. Physical as
well as documentary evidence suggest that the events occurred. The South
Korean investigators submitted a summary of their initial investigation to the
Korean National Assembly. U.S. Troops Killed Refugees During War, Probe
Concludes, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 18, 2000, at 12. After reviewing "690 documents,
trac[ing] the U.S. military maneuvers, and interview[ing 140 survivors, relatives
and villagers," the investigators concluded that U.S. troops killed a large number
of refugees at No Gun Ri. Id.
57.
General Day, Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division in 1950, wrote in
a 1958 report that several 7th Cavalry units, had "behav[ed] badly when they
received the order to withdraw . . . [and had become] somewhat hysterical."
Michael Dobbs, Shoot them All; Half a century after the Korean War, members of
the 7th Cavalry Regiment had hoped for recognition; instead they are having to
accountfor what happened at No Gun Ri, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2000, (Magazine), at
13.
58.
Bernard, supranote 28.
The 2nd battalion, an untrained unit, scattered in panic. That evening,
119 of its men were still missing. In this frantic departure from its
position... the battalion left behind a switchboard, an emergency lighting
unit and weapons of all types. After daylight, truck drivers and platoon
sergeants returned to the scene and recovered 14 machine guns, nine
radios, 120 M-1 rifles, 26 carbines, seven Browning automatic rifles and
six 60-mm mortars.
Id. (quoting from the official Army history). In this author's opinion, the small
arms listed would suffice to outfit a standard infantry rifle company of the time.
59.
Nightline: Investigation Into Why Army Killed South Korean Civilians at
No Gun Ri in July of 1950 (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 21, 1999).
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Company 6 0 have not survived, and the entries in the official log of
the 2/7 Cavalry are missing for the period from July 26 through
July 28, 1950.61
Not only did the soldiers of the ICD have the North Koreans
to contend with, but their avenues of retreat were being
overwhelmed by thousands of South Korean refugees struggling
south to avoid the NKPA advance. 6 2
The movement of these
refugees columns created additional logistical difficulties for U.S.
troops who needed to move equipment and injured personnel to
the rear and bring resupplies forward, and at the same time
conduct a retreat while in heavy contact with a determined
enemy. At this same time, the North Koreans began to take
advantage of the chaos created by the civilians and used them for
their own ends as well. Most ominously, the NKPA began to
infiltrate artillery spotters and Special Forces troops in these
refugee groups in order to get behind the U.S. and ROK forces
and attack them from the rear. 63
As early as July 22, an
American journalist wrote the following account in The New York
7Tmes, "The American G.I. is now beginning to eye with suspicion
any Korean civilian . . .
Watch those guys in white!-the
customary peasant dress-is the cry often heard near the
64
front."
The Eighth Army and its divisions began to instruct their
units in the harshest terms on how to deal with civilians in their
areas of operation. On July 24th the 1CD headquarters issued
an explicit order, "No refugees to cross the front line. Fire everyone
trying to cross lines.6 S Use discretion in case of women and
children." 66 In the unit adjacent to the 1CD, the 25th Infantry
Division, the commanding general instructed his forces that all
friendly civilians were to be evacuated, and all remaining
"civilians seen in this area [were] to be considered as enemy and
action taken accordingly" (which was changed by his staff to

60.
H Company 2/7 Cay. is the unit that is allegedly responsible for the No
Gun Ri massacre. See infra notes 81-92.
61.
Michael Dobbs & Roberto Suro, Army Dismissed Massacre Allegation;
Koreans Sought Redress for Five Years; Cohen Orders Probe, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
1999, at Al.
62.
KNOX, supra note 22, at 71.
63.
Nightline, Oct. 22, 1999, supra note 8. Sec. Caldera said, "North
Koreans did use refugees both to push them out in front of landmines in order to
test the ground, did infiltrate them and carry weapons, carry heavy guns in their
oxcarts so that they could get behind the retreating US and South Korean forces,
and then attack them from the rear." Id.
64.
Elizabeth Becker, PentagonSays It Can Find No Proofof Massacre,N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1999, at A16 (quoting Walter Sullivan, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1950).
65.
Sang-Hun Choe et al., G.L.'s Tell of a U.S. Massacre in Korean War, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1999 at A16.
66.
Id.
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"considered as unfriendly and shot"). 6 7 Finally, on the morning of
July 26, the commanding unit, the Eighth Army, radioed all units
along the front with the message: "No, repeat
no, refugees will be
68
permitted to cross battle lines at any time."
July 26th found several hundred civilians grouped in the
vicinity of the 2/7 defenses. The battalion sent an interpreter and
a jeep to instruct the refugees to disperse because they were
interfering with the unit's operations. 69
The delegation
apparently suffered casualties from sniper fire, and the civilians
did not disperse. 70 The Americans were attempting to direct the
throng off of the southbound dirt road and onto a parallel railroad
track.7 1 Civilian and soldier accounts recall that American
planes then began to strafe an area where some of the civilians
were resting.7 2 This attack may have been a mistake due to pilot
error, as several veterans suggest that a company commander
had requested an air strike against North Korean artillery several
miles up the road. 73 Declassified military documents indicate,
however, that it was not uncommon for Air Force jets in 1950 to
attack groups of Koreans in civilian dress, traveling on the Korean
roads, on the suspicion that they harbored enemy infiltrators. 7 4
Several veterans claim that they had been attempting to direct the
civilians when the planes struck, and that they, along with the
refugees, immediately sought cover from the attack, although the
75
veterans later slipped out.

The civilians located cover under a railroad bridge, described
as an overpass with two large openings, which are twenty-three
feet wide, thirty feet high, and eighty feet long.76 The soldiers in

the 2/7 were familiar with the rumors of NKPA soldiers posing as
peasants. They were also aware that their commander, a wellrespected World War II veteran, had specifically warned Company
H to be on the lookout for such a subterfuge. 77 A retiree who
served as a lieutenant in the 2/7 at the time remembers that
riflemen began to fire upon the refugees as they sought cover in

67.
Id.
68.
Joseph L. Galloway, New Light on an Old Atrocity, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Oct. 11, 1999, at 49.
69.
See Nightline, Oct. 21, 1999, supra note 59, for interview with Herman
Patterson, veteran of 2/7.
70.
See id.
71.
Sang-Hun Choe et al., supranote 65, at Al.
72.
See id.
73.
See id.
74.
Sang-Hun Choe, et al., Korean War Documents Say U.S. Jets Hit
Civilians, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1999, at A20.
75.
Sang-Hun Choe, et al., supra note 65.
76.
See id.
77.
Dobbs, supra note 57, at 12.
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the tunnels. 78 The lieutenant stopped the company's fire and led
a Korean boy under the bridge to join the other refugees. He said
that in his opinion there were no North Koreans mixed in with the
79
terrified peasants.
That evening, Company H, the heavy-weapons company, was
ordered to take up positions and aim their machine-guns at the
civilians hiding under the bridge.8 0 At some point, someone gave
the soldiers the order to fire upon the refugees. Accounts differ,
but several veterans suggest that the company commander, CPT
Chandler, gave the order, but only after discussing it with the
battalion headquarters on the radio. 8 The company may have
received orders from the battalion or its higher headquarters that
were transmitted by a runner, a situation that would have likely
added to the confusion on the battlefield.8 2 Who gave the initial
order may be difficult to resolve given the intervening years and
83
the deaths of many of the participants.
Some of the 2/7 veterans remember firing in response to
muzzle flashes spotted from beneath the darkened railroad
arches. 8 4 Others admit that what they may have seen were
bullets fired by Americans ricocheting off of the concrete walls,
thus appearing to originate from within the tunnels.8 5 Some
veterans report that up to half of the company refused to fire or
else intentionally fired high. 86 While several veterans claim that
they found at least seven North Korean bodies in the tunnels,
others deny this, and twenty-four Korean survivors interviewed by
the Associated Press individually agreed that there were no NKPA
87
soldiers with them under the overpass.
Korean survivors of the tunnel describe three days and
nights of sporadic shooting, with refugees using bodies of dead
loved ones as protection from the American bullets.8 8 Many of
the survivors were permanently disfigured and tell of conditions

78.
Carroll.
79.
80.
81.

Sang-Hun Choe, et al., supra note 65, quoting Retired COL. Robert M.
See id.
See id.
Charles J. Hanley & Martha Mendoza, Big Question Remains: Who

ClearedKillings, DENV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 3, 1999, at 42A.

82.
Dobbs, supranote 57, at 13.
83.
Hanley & Mendoza, supra note 81. CPT Chandler died in 1970. Id.
Other battalion officers were killed during the war. Id. The battalion commander,
Herbert Heyer, is 88 years old and in poor health, and he denied knowledge of the
killings to reporters from the Associated Press. Id.
84.
Mark Thompson, The Bridge at No Gun Ri; Did Panicky G.Ls Massacre
Korean Civiliansat the Beginning of the Korean WarP,TIME, Oct. 11, 1999, at 42.
85.
Dobbs, supranote 57, at 23.
86.
Thompson, supranote 84, at 42.
87.
Sang-Hun Choe, et al., supra note 65.
88.
B.J. Lee, I Still HearScreams, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1999, at 59.
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so poor that they were forced to drink from a bloodstained stream
that ran through the tunnels. 89 Although most of the H Company
veterans deny that they fired on the tunnel for three days, Army
records do not show the unit leaving the area until the 29th,
which indicates that other units in the battalion may have been
rotated in to guard the culverts. 90 Surprisingly, some of the
91
survivors recount U.S. medics treating them after the first day.
Exact numbers of casualties have not been determined, but at the
time survivors compiled a list of 122 known victims, and many
suggest it was as high as 300.92 Whatever the actual facts are, it
is clear that something occurred. 93 The bridge at No Gun Ri still
stands, and for "49 years its concrete was deeply scarred by
bullets" until September 1999, when railroad workers were
instructed to patch the holes. 9 4 Concerned over allegations of a
possible cover-up, Korean officials have since offered to remove
the new plaster. 95
D. Investigating the Facts: The CurrentU.S. Investigation,
as Well as the Korean and U.S. Government Responses
to the Allegations in the Past
The investigation over the past half-century of the No Gun Ri
incident has been anything but direct. Many of the civilian
victims were concerned that they would face reprisals by the
military governments that ran South Korea if they came forward
with claims. 96 At least one individual attempted to file a claim
with the U.S. Military Petitions Office in the 1960s, but missed an
application deadline. 97 Another remembers the local police in the
1970s warning villagers not to discuss the incident. One quoted

89.
See Sang-Hun Choe, Four Scarred Koreans tell of U.S. Massacre, THE
REcoRD (BERGEN COUNTY, NJ), Nov. 13, 1999, at A12.
90.
Dobbs, supranote 57.
91.
See id.
92.
See id.
93.
Interestingly, the North Koreans apparently discovered the massacre
site and published a contemporaneous report on August 2, 1950 to their
propaganda officers to publicize the U.S. actions among their soldiers. Sang-Hun
Choe & Martha Mendoza, CapturedPapers Reveal U.S. Was Told of Killings, THE
GUARDIAN (LONDON), June 16, 2000, at 22. The American high command had
translated copies of the North Korean document "almost immediately after the
incident," raising some question today about U.S. claims of having no knowledge
at the time. Id.
94.
Sang-Hun Choe, et al., supranote 65.
95.

Korean War Killing Inquiry, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Oct. 30, 1999, at

17.
96.
Memories of Dead Children Fuel Searchfor the Truth at No Gun Ri, THE
DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, UT), Oct. 7, 1999, at A9.
97.
See id.
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a police officer as saying, "If you continue to talk about No Gun
Ri, you and your children will be branded as communists."9 8
By 1994, Korean survivor groups felt that the climate had
changed sufficiently in their country following the end of power of
the authoritarian regimes, and began to petition the South
Korean and U.S. governments. 9 9 A series of denials and rebuffs
followed over the next five years.' 0 0 Eventually the allegations
came to the attention of the National Council of Churches (NCC)
in the United States in December 1998. The NCC was asked by
its counterpart, the National Council of Churches in Korea, to
request a response from the Pentagon to the civilian
allegations.' 0 ' In March 1999, the U.S. Army Center for Military
History responded to the NCC request, stating that based on its
review of its records "it had found no information. to substantiate"
the claims of the survivors. 10 2 The Associated Press [A.P.] picked
up wind of the story concerning a possible massacre carried out
by U.S. soldiers in the Korean War, and began its own
investigation. 10 3 The A.P. contacted veterans who supported the
Korean accounts,1 0 4 and together with the documentary evidence
that the Army archives had found to be insufficient (but which in
fact corroborated much of the testimony), published an
incendiary story on September 30, 1999, which forced the
105
Pentagon to reexamine the case.
U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen ordered the Secretary
of the Army to begin a full investigation of the incident.' 0 6 The
10 7
South Korean government also began an inquiry of its own.
The U.S. Army Inspector General (IG) was delegated the task of

98.
Id.
99.
Michael Dobbs & Roberto Suro, Army Dismissed Massacre Allegation;
Koreans Sought Redressfor Five Years, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1999, at Al.
100. See id. "In August 1997, a claim signed by the 30 petitioners was filed
with South Korea's Government Compensation Committee... A lower-level South
Korean compensation committee said people were killed at No Gun Ri but it had
no proof of American involvement. In April 1998, the national panel rejected the
case, saying a five-year statute of limitations expired long ago." Sang-Hun Choe, et
al., supranote 65.
101. No Gun Ri Survivors to Meet with Pentagon Officials, U.S. NEWSWIRE,
Nov. 11, 1999.
102. Elizabeth Becker, PentagonSays It Can Find No Proofof Massacre, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1999, at A16.
103. Sims, supranote 12.
104. Nightline, supranote 8. The A.P. conducted an 18 month investigation.
105. Dobbs and Suro, supranote 99.
106. Nightline, supranote 59.
107. Doug Struck, In Korea, a 49-Year-Old Ghost Rises; Seoul and
Washington Warily Investigating Massacre of Civilians, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Neuillysur-Seine, France), Oct. 29, 1999, at 6. Some "are skeptical of the arrangement of
dual investigations, in which American officials will research U.S. records and
interview former GIs, and South Koreans will delve into the survivors' accounts."
Id.
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conducting the inquiry, and the Secretary of the Army approved a
four-phase plan intended to culminate in a written report to the
public.10 8 The military has established both a website and a toll
free number in order to gather information,1 0 9 and members of
the IG Review Team have visited the alleged massacre site and
spoken with survivors.1 1 0
Secretary of the U.S. Army Louis
Caldera anticipates that the investigation will take at least a year
to complete;"' he has also stated that the investigation has been
granted extraordinary resources, but that it will not investigate
"every firefight, every battle" in which it may be alleged that U.S.
112
soldiers killed civilians.
The Army's Inspector General, Lt. Gen. Michael Ackerman,
leads the IG Review Team, but ultimately the team reports to
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs, Patrick T. Henry 1 13 , who is overseeing its progress.
Fortunately or unfortunately, depending on one's perspective, the
No Gun Ri investigators have several other recent investigations
they can rely on as examples.
One such study was the
14
examination of "The Mystery of the Hungarian 'Gold Train.""
There, the U.S. government probed" s the apparent theft of the
contents of a trainload of valuables, seized by the Nazis from
Jewish victims in Hungary in 1945, and looted by American
Forces who captured the train."16
In addition, the military's
Inspectors General have developed procedures to adequately
investigate high profile, complex, and politically sensitive
incidents in a professional, speedy, and objective manner. The

108.
Army Outlines Phases of No Gun Ri Review, ARMY NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 23,
1999, available at http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Nov1999/a19991123nogun.
html [hereinafter Army Outline]. The review incorporates the following phases: Phase
I - Preparation; Phase II - Research and Interviews; Phase III - Review and Analysis;
Phase IV - Final Report. Id.
109.
Id.
110. THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), supra note 95.
111.
FDCH Transcript, supranote 9, at 8.
112.
U.S. to Limit Its Probe of Korea Claims, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 2000, at 11.
113. Army Outline, supra note 108.
114.
ProgressReport on: The Mystery of the Hungarian'Gold Train," Draft,
Oct. 7, 1999, available at http://www.pcha.gov/goldtrainfinaltoconvert.html. The
progress report is a product of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust
Assets in the United States (PCHA). Id.
115. Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the US,
Commissioners, availableat http://www.pcha.gov/commissioners.htm (last visited
Dec. 20, 1999). Interestingly, Asst. Sec. Henry who is supervising the No Gun Ri
investigation also served on the Gold Train panel himself. Id.
116.
Michael Dobbs, Tarnished Gold; U.S. Report Says G.L 's Liberated, Then
Looted Nazi Train CarryingAssets of HungarianJews, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1999,

at A23.
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investigation of the Tailhook Naval Convention is one such
17
contemporary example.1
III. U.S. JURISDICTION FOR PROSECUTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER
ARMED SERVICES MEMBERS FOR CRIMINAL CONDUCT

The usual ubiquitous "Pentagon sources" have expressed
differing opinions as to whether or not the United States would
consider granting immunity to the U.S. veterans. 1 18
Some
suggest that the military does not intend to allow "wrongdoing [to
be] overlooked" 1 19 and is still considering criminal prosecution.
The ability of the U.S. government to bring charges is not clearcut, and the myriad of issues surrounding a criminal indictment
make it a highly complex problem. This note will first examine
the jurisdictional issues and then review the legal basis for any
charges to be brought.
A. Military CourtsHave Sole JurisdictionOver Armed
Forces Members During Wartime, Whether in
Friendly or Hostile Territory Outside
the United States
A pistol shot fired by a Union soldier in the "insurgent" state
of Tennessee 120 during the closing days of the United States Civil
War rings down through history to reach us today.
Corporal
12 1
Pryor Coleman, Company G, Ist Tennessee Cavalry Volunteers,

117.
See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE TAILHOOK REPORT (St. Martin's
Press 1993) [hereinafter REPORT]. The Tailhook Association Convention was a
yearly symposium conducted by;
a private, nonprofit social/professional organization of naval aviators,
contractors, and others involved in naval aviation, [that had] hosted an
annual professional conference at the Las Vegas Hilton for decades. The
U.S. Navy ha[d] consistently provided significant support and cooperation
to the conference and to the Association. While the quality and usefulness
of the conference has been unchallenged, the social or 'Party' aspects of
the conference have been growing increasingly out of control in the years
before 1991.
Id. at vii.
It was this atmosphere that apparently led to gross misconduct by many of the
participants that attended the 1991 conference, conduct which included sexual
harassment, assault, and battery of female aviators attending Tailhook as well as
civilians who were in many cases unconnected to the Conference. See id. at 1617.
118.
Paul Richter, Deal Weighed in Korean War Slaying Probe, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
23, 1999, at Al (explaining that "Pentagon officials . .. are considering granting an
unprecedented blanket immunity.").
119.
Id.
120.
Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 517 (1878).
121.
Amended Plea, The State of Tennessee v. Pryor Coleman § 21,
Transcript of Record Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1878) (7 Otto 361-564)
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and an accomplice were stationed in the U.S. Military District of
East Tennessee, with forces occupying territory in Knox County,
His accomplice, Rufus
in the vicinity of Knoxville. 12 2
23
Chamless,1 was formerly a resident of the area and apparently
hit upon a plan which the two set off to execute, following the
24
At some
consumption of some alcohol at a local still house.'
at
stopped
two
the
1865,
7,
time between 9 and 10 p.m., March
2s
sixties.'
his
in
then
was
who
Bell,
D.
Philip
of
the farmhouse
Upon gaining admission to the house, Chamless barred the door
and the soldiers demanded money and threatened to kIll Mr. Bell
12 6
Eventually, the
if he did not pay them five hundred dollars.
situation turned violent and Coleman began to pistol-whip Mr.
Miss Mourning Ann Bell, Bell's youngest daughter,
Bell.' 2 7
128
Witnesses
intervened and attempted to prevent further blows.
face
Bell's
explained that Coleman then fired his pistol into Miss
from
at point blank range such that "the bullet went in
appearance, about the nose of the face and came out at the back
of the head " 12 9 and "there was blood splattered on the underside
of the barrel, just beyond the cylinder." 130 The two intruders
then attempted to burn down the house, 13 1 and failing to do so,
32
and
fled the scene. Coleman was arrested on March 9th,'
3
3
1865.1
9,
May
on
court-martial
found guilty by a military
Although sentenced to hang, the punishment was never carried
Consequently, the State of Tennessee brought criminal
out.
charges on October 2, 1874.134
13 5
in
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the state conviction
Coleman v. Tennessee, holding that the murder was solely a
matter for the military courts. 13 6 The court stated that where
American forces are engaged in combat, whether in the "enemy's

microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs (Scholarly Resources, Inc.)
[hereinafter Pryormicrofilm].
Id. para. 19, at 10.
122.
Id. para. 37, at 14.
123.
Id. para. 37, at 14-15.
124.
Id. para. 41-42, at 16.
125.
Id. Another witness claimed the amount was $300. Id. para. 39, at 15.
126.
Id. para. 41, at 16.
127.
Id.
128.
Id. para. 37, at 14 (Testimony of J. C. S. Bell, who saw the victim after
129.
Bell was the brother of the deceased, and interestingly the
the shooting).
prosecutor of Coleman. Id.
Id. para. 43, at 16.
130.
Id. para. 42, at 16.
131.
Id. para. 21, at 10. Chamless was killed attempting to avoid arrest for
132.
his part in the murder. Id. para. 43, at 17.
Coleman, 97 U.S. at 511.
133.
Id. at 510, 511.
134.
Id. at 519.
135.
Id. at 520.
136.
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13
country"' 3 7 or conducting operations in a "friendly country,"
the military court system has exclusive jurisdiction to bring
139
criminal prosecutions against its members.
Military jurisdiction does not, however, extend equally to all
current and former servicemen, regardless of their military status.
Those on active duty are without question subject to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),14 0 whereas the law differs with
respect to the various classes of former members of the armed
services.

B.

Retirees and Reservists May be Tried by a
Military Court-Martial

Retirees are generally defmed as those with a minimum of
twenty years service, who receive retirement pay and benefits.14'
In Pearson v. Bloss,i 42 the U.S. Air Force Court of Military Review
upheld the government's authority to bring charges against a
retiree for violations of the UCMJ.143 Furthermore, the court held
that retirees are members of the "land or naval forces" and
consequently of the military status subject to trial by courtmartial. 44
The recent case of Willenbring v. Neurauter found reservists
to be in a similar category, 145 subject to military court-martial. In
Willenbring, the defendant initially served on active duty, but
following the completion of his enlistment, he joined the Army
While serving as a reservist, the defendant was
Reserve. 146
ordered to active duty in order to stand court-martial for rapes he
The
allegedly committed during his period of active duty.' 4 7
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that Congress
intended for the military to maintain jurisdiction over reservists,

137. Id. at 517. Tennessee was considered "enemy" country as it was a
Confederate state during the "rebellion." Id. at 509, 510.
138. Id.at5l6n.1.
139. See id. at 520. See also 24 Op. Atty Gen. 570, 574 (1903) ("[W]hen armies
of the United States are in hostile territory, and ... engaged in actual warfare, the
jurisdiction of such [military] tribunals over such offenses is exclusive...").
UNI. CODE OF MIL. JUST. art. 2(a)(1) (1950), 10 U.S.C.A. § 802 (West
140.
1998) ("The following persons are subject to these articles . . . all persons
belonging to a regular component of the armed forces...").
141. See generally CROCKER, supranote 14, at 457-66.
142. Pearson v. Bloss, 28 M.J. 764 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989). An Air Force enlisted
man, who retired after 20 years of active service, was convicted of a variety of
larcenous offenses, for stealing military property both before and after his
retirement. Id. The Court of Military Review upheld the right of the government to
subject the defendant to a court-martial. Id.
143. Id. at 766.
144. Id. at 768.
145. See generally Willenbring v. Neurauter, 48 M.J. 152 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
146. Id. at 154.
147.

Id. at 154-55.
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and that the prosecution of Willenbring by a military courtmartial was entirely in line with case precedence, legislative
48
intent, and the UCMJ.i
C. Those DischargedFollowing Completion of theirMilitary
Service Do Not Fall Within a Military Court's Jurisdiction
There is a significant body of law concerning those accused of
committing crimes during their time in service, but who are no
longer serving in the military. In December 1900, during the
American occupation of the Philippines that followed the Spanish
American War, Captain (CPT) Brownell, Commander D Company,
26th IN, U.S. Volunteers, ordered and supervised the
administration of torture to Father Augustine de la Pena, the
parish priest of Dumangas, on the island of Panay. 14 9 This
attempt to gain information on the Filipino insurrection resulted
in the priest's death.'5 0 Elihu Root, Secretary of War, sought to
court-martial Capt. Brownell for the murder of Father de la Pena,
but the officer had been discharged from military service in the
interim. 5 1 Secretary Root requested an opinion from the United
States Attorney General' 5 2 as to the legality of trying him by
court-martial.
Attorney General Knox responded that Coleman was
applicable 5 3 so only a military court would have jurisdiction over
CPT Brownell's conduct in a war-zone, but that this authority was
no longer valid given the officer's discharge.' 5 4 Knox cited Dow v.
Johnson'5 5 for the proposition that for the "preservation of
liberty" and the protection and efficiency of the Army "in service
in the field," it is essential that soldiers be only subject to military
law.i'6
As with the Army, the Navy' S 7 could only bring charges
against a sailor for violations of the Articles for the Government of

148.
Id. at 159-60. The court held that Article 2(d) of the UCMJ was
specifically drafted to allow the military to maintain jurisdiction over reservists
and others listed. But see id. at 170, 174 (stating that Congress did not intend for
Article 2(d) to apply to those who had completely terminated their service (those in
discharged status) because the legislature was concerned with not disturbing the
jurisprudence of Toth and Hirshberg). See infra notes 160-91 and accompanying
text for discussion of Toth and Hirshberg.
149.
24 Op. Att'y Gen. 570 (1903).
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
Id. at 571.
154.
See id. at 574.
155.
100 U.S. 158 (1879).
156. 24 Op. Att'y Gen. at 574 (quoting Dow, 100 U.S. at 166).
157. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 521, 527 (1919) (citing Articles for the Government of
the Navy, REVISED STATUTES, tit. 15, ch. 10, art. 14).
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the Navy while he remained in the service.' 5 8 The U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed this principal in Hirshbergv. Cooke, a case arising
out of actions that occurred during World War II.15 9 Hirshberg
was a Navy enlisted man who was serving his second enlistment,
when, in 1942, he was captured on Corregidor by the
Japanese.160 It was alleged that during his time as a prisoner of
war, Hirshberg mistreated two other sailors were working under
his charge. 16 1 Hirshberg was eventually freed, and his enlistment
ended March 26, 1946. He re-enlisted for an additional four
years, but from March 26 to March 27, he was honorably
discharged from the previous enlistment until the new one took
effect. 16 2 Sometime in 1947, the Navy learned of the alleged
mistreatment and brought charges against Hirshberg, 163 which
The sailor
resulted in his conviction by a court-martial. 1 6 4
claimed that the Navy lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him for
actions that occurred before his discharge. Ultimately, his case
The Navy argued that
reached the U.S. Supreme Court. 165
Hirshberg was "continuously 'in the Navy' except for an interval of
a few hours"16 6 and therefore jurisdiction over him would be
proper. 16 7 The Supreme Court rejected this argument out of
concern that the duration allowing military jurisdiction between
service and discharge might be stretched into a constitutionally
dubious argument if they established such a precedent in this
case. 168

Prior to the Hirshberg case, the government apparently
accepted that the military's court-martial jurisdiction over former
service members ended upon their completion of service. 169 This
principle was followed until the adoption of the UCMJ, with the
exception of frauds committed against the government by former
service-members, over which Congress had already granted
Until the
military court-martials continuing jurisdiction. 170
adoption of the UCMJ which attempted to codify a uniform law

Id. at 521.
United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949).
Id. at 211.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 212.
Id.
Id. at 213.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 217.
Articles of War 94 of 1948, reprinted in COL. FREDERICK B. WIENER, THE
EXPLANATION, COMPARATIVE TEXT,
&
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE:
COMMENTARY 232 (1950).
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
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among all the services, the various services had their own
17 1
disciplinary laws.
In revising the Military Code, Congress attempted to remedy
the jurisdictional issue that Hirshberg presented by drafting a
section of the UCMJ to cover this situation. 17 2 UCMJ Article
Three confirms the military's jurisdiction over service members
regardless of a change of status if the crime occurred while
subject to the UCMJ. 173 This provision has been upheld as it
pertains to reservists, 17 4 but it was quickly challenged in Toth v.
Quarles as it applied to those service members who were

discharged. 175
On the night of September 27, 1952, Airman Robert Toth,
who was stationed at an Air Force logistics depot in Tageu, Korea,
during the Korean War, 17 6 allegedly shot and killed a male
Korean national. 177 Accounts vary, but apparently while serving
as Sergeant of the Guard, 178 Toth was alerted that a sentry had
apprehended a drunk Korean male in the vicinity of the depot's

171. Id. at 1.
172. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 3(a), 70A Stat. 38 (1956)
(current version at 10 U.S.C.A. § 803(a) (1998)).
For a discussion of the
application of the UCMJ to the facts of the No Gun Ri incident, see supra notes
94-100 and accompanying text.
173. Id. Article 3: Jurisdiction to try certain personnel. Id. 3(a) "Subject to
the provisions of Article 43" [Statute of limitations] "any person charged with
having committed, while in a status which he was subject to this code" [Article 2:
Persons Subject to the code-including active duty personnel, reservists during
training, retired personnel, others listed] "[a felony] shall not be relieved from
amenability to trial by courts-martial by reasons of the termination of said status."

Id.
174. See Willenbring v. Neurauter, 48 M.J. 152, 160 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
175. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
176. See BLAIR, supra note 23, at 59, 975. The Korean conflict began June
25th, 1950 with the North Korean invasion of South Korea, and ended with the
Armistice (which is still in force, as there has been no official peace treaty ending
the war) on July 27, 1953. Id.
177. Return and Answer to Rule to Show Cause, Respondent, Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), microfiched on U.S. Supreme Court Records and
Briefs, card 1 of 7 (Microcard) [hereinafter Return and Answer].
178. Twenty-four hours a day, military headquarter units (at battalion,
brigade, division, etc.) maintain a Staff Duty Officer (SDO), and a Staff Duty NCO
to be on call for emergencies, maintain radio communications, conduct security
checks, and relay information (among other duties). During non-duty hours or
times in which the primary staff is not available the Duty Officer often has to
make critical decisions and supervise the unit's status until proper commanders
have been notified. Units (generally company or platoon level units) performing
security at perimeters, depots, motor pools, etc., appoint a Sergeant of the Guard
to supervise, check up on, and maintain the guard shifts that are performing the
security function. The Sergeant of the Guard generally is required to periodically
update the SDO, and is to contact him in the event of an emergency. (Information
on general military practice is provided by the author, who served as SDO on
numerous occasions while stationed in the United States, as well as forward
deployed in Korea.)
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He loaded the suspect into a jeep and
bomb dump. 17 9
transported him to Air Police Headquarters; en route they
scuffled. 1 80 After he contacted the officer on duty, Toth was
allegedly instructed to return the man to where he was
apprehended and shoot him.' 8 ' While sentries were generally
allowed to shoot trespassers in secure areas, the facts of this case
1 82
suggest that the decision to do so was highly questionable.
Airman Toth completed his term of service and was discharged on
December 8, 1952.183 The Air Force investigated the incident,
and five months later military police arrested Toth at the steel
mill he was working at in Pittsburgh and flew him to Korea to face
a court-martial. 18 4 The Air Force believed that the new UCMJ
gave them proper jurisdiction over Toth. 185
The Supreme Court strongly rejected the Air Force's
argument because the justices were concerned that such
jurisdiction would allow an Article I military panel to supersede
the Constitutionally granted judicial function of the Article III
courts. 18 6 The Air Force suggested that the current law created a
legal loophole by which ex-servicemen must be tried either by a
court-martial or escape prosecution entirely. 18 7 Justice Black
found this argument to be without merit and recommended that
any jurisdictional deficiency that existed due to this holding could
be remedied by Congressional action granting federal district
188
courts the right to try former military members in such cases.
To date, such a solution has not been crafted. It is in this status
that the jurisdictional issue has remained, with Congress

Affidavits in the Designation of Record, Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11
179.
(1955), microfiched on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, card 2 of 7
(Microcard).
180.

See id.

See id.
181.
See id. Toth suggested that the Lieutenant was "out to get glory," and
182.
that apparently the unit was commended for its handling of security. Id. There is
no evidence in the record that Toth was ordered to commit the crime by the duty
officer, but the author would suggest that another possible motive for any such
order would have been a desire for simplicity, to send a message of seriousness,
and the concern that "civilians" trespassing were actually saboteurs, a concept
that in wartime could easily lead to lethal solutions.
Return and Answer, supranote 177.
183.
See Toth, 350 U.S. at 13.
184.
Id. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
185.
Toth, 350 U.S. at 14-15.
186.
Id. at 20-21.
187.
Id. at 21.
188.
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seemingly willing to accept this loop hole' 8 9 and recent case law
consistently applying Toth.l 9 0
D. With JurisdictionOver Retirees Preserved by
Military Courts and Eliminatedfor those
Discharged,an Equal ProtectionClaim is
Suggested, But Would Likely be Found
to be Invalid
Under the current case law, military retirees may be courtmartialed for crimes they committed during their military
service. 19 1 Other soldiers in the retiree's unit, with whom they
may have shared a foxhole, along whose side they may have fired
their weapon, who may have been fully complicit in the
commission of a crime or even given the orders for others to
commit, may avoid military jurisdiction due to their status as
19 2
discharged rather than retired.
From a cursory glance, it may appear that those who fall
under military jurisdiction would have an equal protection claim
against prosecution.
How is it that they may be subject to
prosecution for crimes they committed in wartime service, and
their neighbor who was involved in the same crimes is not, merely
through the seemingly arbitrary distinction of having a different
military status? Case law suggests that courts have found this
argument to have little or no merit. What this argument appears
most similar to is an equal protection claim based on selective
prosecution. 193 The Fifth Circuit perhaps best stated the law's
view of such a defense when it said: "It has never been held that

189.
See, e.g., Willenbring v. Neurauter, 48 M.J. 152, 170 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
The federal law has been crafted to remain consistent with both Toth and
Hirshberg regarding those whose "military status [had] completely terminated." Id.
190.
See Willenbring, supra notes 145-48, 189; Smith v. Vanderbush, 47
M.J. 56, 59-61 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
Vanderbush held that the Army could not
maintain court-martial jurisdiction over a soldier that it had discharged, even
though it had begun court-martial proceedings before his discharge from the
service. Had the Army acted to "flag" the soldier's records, and prevented his
administrative discharge the service could have maintained jurisdiction over the
service-member. See id. at 61.
191.
See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
192.
See supra notes 149-90 and accompanying text.
193.
See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
Selective
prosecution claims are to be judged in accordance with standard equal protection
criteria. Plaintiffs must "show both that the passive enforcement system had a
discriminatory effect and "a discriminatory purpose." Id.
Wayte involved a
challenge to the prosecution of the petitioner for failing to register for the draft
with the Selective Service System as being selectively discriminatory. The Court
held that the prosecution of only those that made their failure to register a public
act of disobedience, and of those who in doing so ignored repeated government
requests to properly enroll in the program (such as petitioner), did not constitute
an equal protection violation. Id.
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one who is guilty of a crime cannot be punished merely because
19 4
others equally guilty have not been prosecuted or convicted."
The situation in which retirees are prosecuted and those
discharged are not can be analogized to a similar circumstance in
criminal law. It is no defense to claim that one cannot be
prosecuted in the jurisdiction merely because others have left the
jurisdiction and either cannot be located or else brought into the
locale. In this situation, the retirees remain in the military's
jurisdiction, while those who were discharged have left it. 195
IV. IN A PROSECUTION OF THE 2/7 CAVALRY VETERANS
FOR THE ALLEGED WAR CRIMES COMMITTED AT No GUN RI,
WHAT U.S. LAWS WOULD HAVE APPLIED TO THEIR
BEHAVIOR? ADDITIONALLY, AS THE UNITED STATES IS A
SIGNATORY TO MANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND
CONVENTIONS, WHICH OF THESE MAY PROSCRIBE AND
ADDRESS THE CRIMINAL CONDUCT OR "WAR CRIMES"
ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN THIS CASE?

Section III of this note established the proposition that in all
likelihood the military would only have jurisdiction over those
veterans of the No Gun Ri incident who retired from the
service. 1 9 6 Were the U.S. Army to attempt to bring charges
against these retirees, a significant issue would arise over what
law would apply to their conduct. The military has its own body
of law that could conceivably apply, beginning with the Articles of
197
War, the criminal statutes which the UCMJ replaced.
International Law also provides some law that may apply to the
retirees' conduct.
The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
between the United States and the Republic of Korea governs the
jurisdiction of the U.S. military and the Korean national courts in
the prosecution of American service-members accused of
wrongdoing while serving in Korea. 19 8 Finally, the international
community has developed a body of law and custom specifically
regarding the laws of war and war crimes in the Geneva
Convention and its additional protocols, 19 9 as well as through

194.
Saunders v. Lowry, 58 F.2d 158, 159 (5th Cir., 1932). A selective
prosecution equal protection claim suggests that the law is not applied equally,
and that only certain persons face prosecution. Id.
195.
Cf. supra notes 193-94 for the analogous situation of selective
prosecution.
196.
See supra notes 141-95 and accompanying text.
197.
The applicability of the UCMJ is detailed infra notes 225-28 and
accompanying text.
198. The SOFA is discussed infra at notes 242-74 and accompanying text.
199.
See infra notes 286-318 and accompanying text.
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prosecutions conducted by international tribunals in accordance
20 0
with the Nuremberg Charter.
A. The Law of Land Warfare2 0 '
During the Civil War, the U.S. Army began to consider
codifying rules on how war was to be conducted, 20 2 and on April
24, 1863, it published its first manual prescribing the laws of war
in General Orders 100: Instructionsfor the Government of Armies
of the United States in the Field.20 3
The manual laid the
framework for the conduct of the U.S. Army in its dealings with
20 4
prisoners of war, civilians, and protection of civilian property.
The period prior to World War I saw perhaps the greatest number
of international conventions, agreements, and charters designed
to ensure peace or minimize the horrors of war. 20 s In 1914, the
U.S. Army revised General Order 100, under the new title Rules of

200.
See infra notes 275-87 and accompanying text.
201.
Taylor, supranote 2, at 366. The laws of war are of ancient origin. Id.
The most important concept they were historically premised on is "that the
ravages of war should be mitigated as far as possible by prohibiting needless
cruelties, and other acts that spread death and destruction and are not
reasonably related to the conduct of hostilities. Id. The seeds of such a principle
must be nearly as old as human society." Id.
202. Id. at 67.
In 1863 President Lincoln approved the promulgation by the War
Department of the Instructions... prepared by Francis Lieber [hence the
Instructions are often known as the Lieber Code], a German veteran of the
Napoleonic wars, who emigrated to the United States and became professor
of law and political science at Columbia University. These comprised 159
articles, covering such subjects as 'military necessity,' 'punishment of
crimes against the inhabitants of hostile countries,' 'prisoners of war,' and
'spies.' It was by a military commission appointed in accordance with
these instructions that Mary Suratt and the others accused of conspiring
to assassinate Lincoln were tried.
Id.
203.
DONALD A. WELLS, THE LAWS OF LAND WARFARE: A GUIDE TO THE U.S.
ARMY MANUALS 1 (Greenwood Press 1992).
204.
Id. at 3. Custom should govern the treatment of civilians in time of
war. Id. at 26.
205.
Id. at 6-7. The First Geneva Convention established the International
Red Cross in 1864. Id. A second Convention protecting medical staff was signed
in 1868. Id. The Conference at St. Petersburg in 1868 aimed to reduce needlessly
painful weapons, focusing on explosive or inflammable projectiles.
Id. The
Declaration of Brussels, August 27, 1864 forbade, among other things, poison
weapons, the killing of those who have surrendered, the policy of granting no
quarter, and weapons designed to promote unnecessary suffering. Id. Two
Congresses at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 focused on the mistreatment of
prisoners of war and the protection of civilians from the bombardment of
unfortified cities, and again forbade weapons that were designed to inflict
"superfluous injury.* Id. at 7.
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Land Warfare (1914).206 The Rules of Land Warfare were further

revised in 1934 and 1940.207
Prior to World War II, the laws of war 20 8 were primarily

20 9
oriented on the conduct of nations rather than individuals.

"Individual soldiers who followed

orders were exempt from

punishment for crimes of war, as were the high government
officials who may have given the orders [to do so]. "210
On
November 15, 1944, a change was implemented in the Army
manual so that individuals, organizations, and government
211
officials were now culpable for violations of the laws of war.
There was the caveat, however, that actions that were committed
pursuant to a superior order may be taken into account in
2 12
determining culpability or in the mitigation of punishment.

This

formulation

was

seen

as

highly

problematic

precisely

because no guidance was given as to when such orders should be

considered, and whether they should be considered "as a defense
2 13
or merely in mitigation."

Prior to the First World War, the rules of land warfare had

always been premised on two main points:

first, there was a

sharp distinction between combatants and non-combatants, and

only combatants were to be targeted, and second, that some
weapons and strategies were considered too horrific to pursue.

2 14

All sides seemed to ignore these practices in World War I and II,
and the Army's final revision of the Law of Land Warfare in 1956

206.
Id. at 5, 8. The 1914 manual listed the conventions to which the U.S.
considered itself bound.
Id.
This included the 1864 and 1868 Geneva
Conferences, the Declaration of St. Petersburg, and the Declaration of Brussels.
Id. It excluded two of the three Hague Declarations, but included the Geneva
Convention of 1906 dealing with the treatment of the wounded and sick.
The Rules of Land Warfare (1914) did recognize that war was still a nasty and
violent business, and that civilians would often suffer in its conduct. Id. "Military
necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies and of
other persons whose destruction is incidentally [sic] unavoidable in the armed
contests of war" [emphasis added]. Id. at 36 (quoting General Order 100, Art. 15).
207.
Id. at 8, 10.
208. The incredibly influential ethical concept of "Just War" had an early
development in Christian and European thought, beginning with St. Augustine
and elaborated in the thirteenth century by St. Thomas Aquinas. Telford Taylor,
Just and Unjust Wars, in WAR, MORALITY, & THE MILITARY PROFESSION 226, 227-29
(Malham M. Wakin ed., 1986). In the Just War tradition, conduct demonstrating
proportionality and noncombatant immunity are essential (emphasis added). A. J.
COATES, THE ETHICS OF WAR 209 (Manchester Univ. Press 1997).
209.
See WELLS, supra note 203, at 13.
210.
Id.
211.
Id.
212.
Id. at 24 (citing revision of 1944, Rules of Land Warfare
345.1
(1940)).
213.
Telford Taylor, Superior Orders & Reprisals, in WAR, MORALITY, & THE
MILITARY PROFESSION 380, 384 (Malham M. Wakin ed., 1986).
214.
WELLS, supranote 203, at 13.
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appeared to accept
the abandonment of these principles in
215
modem custom.
The 1944 revision of the Law of Land Warfare2 16 would likely
be the applicable basis of law to judge the actions of the soldiers
at No Gun Ri. Regardless, the latest version of the manual
(1956), revised in 1976,217 is also worth discussing because its
principles would likely guide any modem military prosecutors.
The 1956 manual recognized the Geneva Convention of 1949 as
applicable law, and declared that civilians were to be protected
under the laws of nations. 2 18
Paragraph 498(c) established
21 9
personal liability for soldiers who commit war crimes.
Paragraph 507(b) detailed jurisdiction for those persons charged
with war crimes, and interestingly allowed the U.S. to prosecute
foreign soldiers for violating the laws of war but did not allow
22 0
other nations to prosecute U.S. servicemen.
221
Paragraph 509 addresses the defense of superior orders,
stipulating that following superior orders would not constitute a
defense to a war crimes charge for an individual. The paragraph
also added the caveat "unless he did not know and could not
reasonably have been expected to know that the act ordered was
unlawful. " 22 2
This last exception creates such a subjective
standard that it seems reasonable to predict that a competent
defense counsel could establish a reasonable degree of doubt and
protect his client from being found guilty under the Laws of
Warfare. Given the chaotic nature of the events at No Gun Ri, it
seems clear that any veterans facing charges for their actions
could find some refuge in the apparent inconsistency of
paragraph 509. A military lawyer, writing in 1953, seemed to wel
encompass the attitude of the time on the subject when he wrote
that many international lawyers regarded the concept of military
necessity as allowing the military to excuse unlawful behavior,
and that similarly many military officers regarded the law of war
as only so man good intentions, unrelated to the actual conduct
2 23
of war.

215.
Id. "Modem custom allowed deliberate war on non-combatants and the
use of any weapons without review." Id.
216. The 1944 edition contained the changed perception of command
responsibility. See id. at 24 (citing Rules of Land Warfare 345.1 (1994 revision)).
217.
See id. at 185 (bibliography).
218.
See id. at 33.
219.
Id. at 121 (citing FM 27-10 Law of Land Warfare (1956) 1 498).
220.
Id. at 123.
221.
See id. at 120. It is worth noting that paragraph 509 falls under a
section titled "Defenses Not Available."
222.
Id. (citing 1 509) (emphasis added).
223.
Major William Gerald Downey, Jr., The Law of War and Military
Necessity, 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 251, 252 (1953). Major Downey wrote:
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B. The Uniform Code of Military Conduct (UCMJ), and the
Articles of War
The alleged massacre at No Gun Ri occurred in July 1950.224
On May 5, 1950, President Truman signed House Report 4080,
"An Act to unify, consolidate, revise, and codify the Articles of
War, the Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the
disciplinary laws of the Coast Guard, and to enact and establish a
Uniform Code of Military Justice."2 2 s The UCMJ, however, with
the exception of Article 67(a)22 6 and Section 12,227 only became
effective as a whole on May 31, 1951.228 The current UCMJ
Article 118 (Murder) would not be applicable to the soldiers at No
2 29
Gun Ri, whereas Article of War 92 (Murder-Rape) would be.
Excluding the jurisdictional scope of the UCMJ, 230 clearly
only Article 92 would apply, and its wording gives a court-martial
231
broad discretion in the punishment of unpremeditated murder.
Under the common law the repeal of a penal statute, such as the
Articles of War, or its replacement by a new act such as the
UCMJ had the effect of "expung[ing] the act from the statute
books as though it had never existed." 23 2 This common law rule

granted immunity from indictment or prosecution for violations of

To many international lawyers and army officers the terms 'law of war' and
military necessity' are mutually incompatible.
Many army officers
consider the law of war as no more than a collection of pious platitudes,
valueless, so they think, because it has no force and effect. Some
international lawyers regard military necessity as the bUte noire of
international jurisprudence, destroying all legal restriction and allowing
uncontrolled brute force to rage rampant over the battlefield or wherever
the military have control.
Id.
Downey went on to argue that the concepts could be proven to be compatible,
but his comments are perhaps most valuable for the insight they offer on the
views of his day. See id.
224. See supranotes 69-95 and accompanying text.
225. WIENER, supra note 170, at 1.
226. Article 67 of the UCMJ (1950) concerns the power of Review by the
Court of Military Appeals. Id. at 164.
227. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 147 (dealing with granting of new
trials to those accused in cases arising from World War II).
228. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 145.
229. Article 92 of the Articles of War (1948) reads: "MURDER RAPE-Any
person subject to military law found guilty of murder shall suffer death or
imprisonment for life, as a court-martial may direct; but if found guilty of murder
not premeditated, he shall be punished as a court-martial may direct (emphasis
added)." WIENER, supra note 170, at 220-2 1. Note the discretion granted military
court-martials by this Article of War.
230. See supranote 140 and accompanying text.
231. Id.
232.

NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 23.36 (Clark, Boardman & Callaghan 5th ed. 1993).
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the law when it was in operation.2/ 3
Congress found this
presumption to be inequitable and passed its first general savings
provision in 1871,234 and the current version as of 1947 is found
at 1 U.S.C.A. § 109. Section 109 states that:
The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or
extinguish any penalty . . . unless the repealing Act shall so
expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still
remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action
or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or
liability. 2 3 5

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the general saving clause
applies to criminal statutes, thereby allowing the prosecution and
punishment of individuals under the laws that existed at the time
the crime was committed. 2 36 This principle has been upheld in
2
cases involving military law or regulations as well. 37
Article 92 states, "Any person subject to military law found
guilty of murder shall suffer death or imprisonment for life, as a
court-martial may direct;" however, if the murder was not
premeditated, the court-martial may direct other punishment.2 3 8
Federal law prohibits any statute of limitations for offenses that
are punishable by death2 3 9 and undoubtedly homicide, as defined
by Article 92, meets this criterion.
It seems clear that military prosecutors seeking to charge
retired veterans with murder for the actions at No Gun Ri in 1950
would have to bring indictments under the Articles of War rather
than the UCMJ 2 40 and, given Congressional law, the Articles
would still fully apply. 2 4 1 A novel situation arises because there
is no federal statute of limitations for prosecuting murder, a
capital crime. Therefore, defendants standing before a U.S.
military court-martial in the year 2000, facing allegations of
criminal homicide committed in 1950, would be, at the youngest,
almost seventy years old.

233.
See id.
234.
Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 660 (1974)
(citing 16 Stat. 432 (1871)).
235.
1 U.S.C.A. § 109 (West 1997).
236. Lewisburg Penitentiary, 417 U.S. at 661 (citing United States v.
Reisinger, 128 U.S. 398, 402 (1888)).
237.
Goublin v. United States, 261 F. 5 (9th Cir. 1919) (defendant was
charged with violating an act forbidding prostitution near a military camp in
World War I).
238.
WEINER, supra note 170, at 220-21.
239.
"An indictment for any offense punishable by death may be found at
any time without limitation." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3281 (West 2000).
240.
See supranotes 229-32 and accompanying text.
241.
See supranotes 233-39 and accompanying text.
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C. The Status of ForcesAgreement (SOFA) Between the
United States and the Republic of Korea Establishes
Jurisdictionfor CriminalProsecutionof U.S.
Servicemen by the Respective Nations
The United States and the Republic of Korea signed a Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA)2 4 2 that became effective in 1967.24 3
Article XXII, 2 4 4

Section One, establishes the jurisdiction of the

U.S. 2 4 5 and Korean military authorities 2 46 to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over

U.S. armed

forces members.

Section Three

details the applicable rules regarding concurrent jurisdiction
between the two authorities. 2 47 The U.S. military has the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction in "offenses arising out of any act or
omission done in the performance of official duty."248 In all other
2 50
offenses, 2 49 the Korean authorities have primary jurisdiction.
It

appears self-evident that actions conducted in

combat would

logically fall within the "performance of official duty" rubric,
thereby ensuring primacy of U.S. military jurisdiction. The state
with the primary right of jurisdiction may choose not to exercise
this right and may turn over the individual for prosecution by the
other state's authorities. 2 5 1
Additionally, the state with the
primary right may choose not to exercise its jurisdiction and may

242.
See also SERGE LAZAREFF, STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES UNDER CURRENT
INTERNATIONAL LAW 57-59 (1971) (chapter entitled "General Doctrine About the
Status of Forces Stationed in a Foreign Country"); JOSEPH M. SNEE & KENNETH A.
PYE, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT: CRIMINAL JURISDICTION (Oceana Pub. 1957)
(Snee and Pye also examine the development of SOFAs among NATO member
nations, with a specific focus on criminal jurisdiction).
243. Agreement under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Regarding the Facilities and
Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea, July
9, 1966, U.S.-S. Korea, 17 U.S.T. 1677 [hereinafter SOFA].
244.
SOFA, art. XXII, 17 U.S.T. at 1695.
245.
SOFA, art. XXII, § l(a), 17 U.S.T. at 1695. "The military authorities of
the United States shall have the right to exercise within the Republic of Korea all
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the United
States over members of the United States armed forces or civilian component, and
their dependents..." Id.
246.
SOFA, art. XXII, § 1(b), 17 U.S.T. at 1695. "The authorities of the
Republic of Korea shall have jurisdiction over the members of the United States
armed forces or civilian component, and their dependents, with respect to offenses
committed within the territory of the Republic of Korea and punishable by the law
of the Republic of Korea." Id.
247.
SOFA, art. XXII, 17 U.S.T. at 1695-96.
248.
SOFA, art. XXII, § 3(a)(ii), 17 U.S.T. at 1695.
249.
SOFA, art. XXII, § 3(a)(i), 17 U.S.T. at 1695 (excepting those against
U.S. property and interests).
250.
SOFA, art. XXII, § 3(b), 17 U.S.T. at 1696.
251.
SOFA, art. XXII, § 3(c), 17 U.S.T. at 1696.
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ask the other nation to waive its right to prosecute the
25 2
individuals.
While serving in the "539th Transportation Truck Company"
during the Korean War in June 1951, Wyatt Jennings was found
by a court-martial to have committed the "unpremeditated
murder of a Korean boy" and an "assault upon a child under the
age of sixteen years." 2 53 Petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of
the military courts with a novel argument. Counsel argued that
when the United States Armed Forces entered the Korean War on
June 30, 1950, they did so "under the banner of the United
Nations," 2S 4 and, therefore, the U.S. military lacked proper
jurisdiction to try him for his crimes. 25 s
"Rejecting [his]
argument, that, inter alia, the Republic of Korea was a sovereign
state and that he should have been tried in one of its courts
[rather than by court-martial], the court held [his] theory to be
completely devoid of merit" and found him to be, without
25 6
question, subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. Army.
Jennings v. Markley clearly established that the United States
military has the primary jurisdiction for crimes committed by its
soldiers abroad during wartime. 2 S 7 Interestingly, the facts of
Jennings s8 are in many ways analogous to the charges that
could reasonably be expected to be made in a case brought
against former soldiers for the alleged massacre at No Gun Ri: the
murder[s] of South Korean nationals by U.S. service-members
during the Korean War.
D. Would Application of the U.S.-R.O.K. Status of
ForcesAgreement to the Soldiers Accused of
Possible War Crimes Violate the Ex Post Facto
ConstitutionalProvision?
The SOFA between the United States and South Korea was
not in effect during the alleged war crimes incident. 25 9 If the

252.
Id.
In such a case the secondary state "shall give sympathetic
consideration" to such a request. Id.
253. Jennings v. Markley, 186 F. Supp. 611, 613 (S.D. Ind. 1960), affd, 290
F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1961).
254.
Id. at 612; SOFA supranote 243.
255. Jennings, 186 F.Supp. at 612.
256.
Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Criminal Jurisdictionof Courts of Foreign
Nations Over American Armed Forces Stationed Abroad § 4, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 725,
737 (1973) (the Seventh Circuit reviewed petitioner's claim that only the
International Court of Justice, or the Civil Court of Korea had jurisdiction to try
him for his crimes); Jennings v. Markley, 290 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1961) (finding
that the claims had been fully addressed by the District Court, the Circuit
affirmed the District Court's ruling).
257.
Jennings, 186 F. Supp. at 613.
258.
Id.
259.
See supra notes 68-91 and accompanying text.
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United States military, which would have the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction in this type of matter under the SOFA, 2 60
declined to exercise its jurisdiction and attempted to allow the
Republic of Korea to try the Americans, would that violate the
Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws?
The case of United States v. Brooks2 6 1 considered whether
procedural changes in the Military Rule of Evidence violated
soldiers' constitutional rights. The soldier was court-martialed for

marijuana use and for rape.2 6 2

The serviceman appealed his

conviction, and the case proceeded through a variety of reviews
26 3
up through the Court of Military Appeals and rehearings.
During this arduous process, the Military Rules of Evidence were
changed. Specifically, Rule 412, the military's version of the
Federal Rules' "rape-shield" provision, was promulgated. 2 64 At
the defendant's rehearing, the military judge denied a defense
motion for permission to cross-examine the victim on her past
sexual history.2 6 5 The defendant appealed to the U.S. Army
Court of Military Review on the claim that the ruling was in error
because the change in procedure violated defendant's rights as
per the ex post facto provision of the Constitution. 2 6 6 The court
held that even a procedural change that disadvantages a
defendant in its application is not ex postfacto.2 6 7 The change of
procedure in appellant's case did not affect his substantive rights
because "its application did not affect the crime, the punishment,
8
26
or the degree of proof necessary to establish [his] guilt."

Retroactive application of a criminal statute by the military
courts does, however, violate the ex postfacto clause, as does the
retroactive application of a judicial construction of a statute. 2 6 9
The issue in United States v. McDonagh was whether the
defendant was subject to military court-martial for drug
trafficking when he conspired with his recruiter to fraudulently

260. See SOFA, supra note 244, at 1695.
261. United States v. Brooks, 17 M.J. 584 (A.C.M.R. 1983).
262. Id. The soldier admitted to using marijuana but denied the charge of
rape. Id. at 584-85.
263. Id.
264. Nonconsensual Sexual Offenses; Relevance of Victim's Behavior or
Sexual Predisposition, MIL. R. EVID. 412, STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., MILITARY
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL at 596 (Lexis Law Pub. 1997); Brooks, 17 M.J. at 585,
n.3 ("Rule 412 became effective on 1 September 1980").
265. Brooks, 17 M.J. at 585.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 586.
268. Id. The Brooks court also earlier cited Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S.
565, 590 (1896), for the proposition that "the inhibition upon the passage of ex
postfacto laws does not give a criminal a right to be tried, in all respects, by the
law in force when the crime was committed." Id.
269. United States v. McDonagh, 14 M.J. 415, 419 (C.M.A. 1983).
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enlist. 2 70 The Court of Military Appeals noted the difficulty that

the U.S. Supreme Court had previously encountered in defining a
substantive versus a procedural change in process sufficient to
violate the ex post facto provision. 2 7 1 The court concluded that
no general proposition could be stated for which alterations of
procedure would be sufficient to "transgress the constitutional
2 72
prohibition" because it was always a matter of degree.
Ultimately, the "constitutional provision was intended to secure
substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive
2 73
legislation."
Would a court find the application of the SOFA to the actions
of soldiers taken in 1950 to have a procedural or a substantive
effect on the defendant? It seems reasonable that the granting of
jurisdiction to a foreign nation's courts is more significant than
the application of the "rape-shield" Rules of Evidence found to be
procedural in Brooks.27 4 Those who committed possibly criminal
acts in 1950 did not reasonably contemplate such a change in
jurisdiction, and therefore retroactive application would more
closely fall under McDonagh. 275 Prosecution by the Republic of
Korea of the No Gun Ri veterans in accordance with the SOFA
seems likely to be a dubious proposition, irrespective of the
question of the "sender nation" granting such jurisdiction.
E. Does the Nuremberg Charterand the International
Criminal TribunalRegime it EstablishedApply
in this Case?
The Nuremberg Charter 2 7 6 was a declaration made by the
victorious allied powers 2 7 7 that sought to establish a body of
international law which would allow for the prosecution of Nazi
officials by an international military tribunal.
The charter
identified three areas of jurisdiction for the tribunal: Crimes

270. Id. at 416. If he had never properly enlisted, defendant would not be
subject to military jurisdiction. In this case, however, Congress had recently
changed the UCMJ's Article 2, 10 U.S.C. 802, so that anyone who submitted to
military authority, even if not properly enlisted, would be considered as falling
within military jurisdiction. Id. at 416 n. 1.
271. Id. at 420 (citing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981))
(holding that for a criminal law to be ex post facto it must be retrospective, and it
must disadvantage the offender).
272. Id. at 420-21.
273. Id. at 421.
274. See supranotes 261-68 and accompanying text.
275.
See supra notes 269-73 and accompanying text.
276. Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war
criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter
Nuremberg Charter].
277. The United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Id.
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Crimes Against
War Crimes, 2 79 and
Against Peace, 2 78
2 80
The development of this body of law focused on the
Humanity.
behavior of states and sought to address the criminal behavior of
state actors, while allowing for the criminal prosecution of
individuals for their role as state representatives or for their
individual conduct. 2 8 ' The crimes against peace and humanity
primarily focused on state policies and actions, while war crimes
were readily applicable to individuals and "had to be limited
stricto sensu as offenses 'against the laws and customs of war'
Following the
rather than to be defined more broadly."28 2
Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, the international community has
widely accepted the principle that it may defime certain behavior
of states as criminal. 28 3 Critics, however, cite the charter as an
War II, and
example of "victor's justice" created ad hoc for World
2 84
"created ex postfacto with retroactive jurisdiction."
The basic substance of the Nuremberg Charter is that an
international tribunal can prosecute a broad assortment of
crimes; but, as a matter of fact, most war crimes that have been
prosecuted were brought by states in their own courts, and
28s
generally dealt with crimes committed by their armed forces.
In the half-a-century since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials,
actual international tribunals have been highly infrequent in
practice. Only two tribunals have occurred over the last decade
those for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, with the proposed trials 28of6
Saddam Hussein and Pol Pot suffering intellectual crib deaths.
The legacy of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials has been the
establishment of international norms regarding war crimes and
the concept of international cooperation in the enforcement of
The international community, however, has
such norms. 28 7
shown "a failure of nerve" in the establishment of any
"international machinery" for the enforcement of these same
28 8
principles.

278.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 276, art. 6(a), 82 U.N.T.S. at 288.
Nuremberg Charter, supranote 276, art. 6(b), 82 U.N.T.S. at 288.
279.
280.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 276, art. 6(c), 82 U.N.T.S. at 288.
281.
Gerry J. Simpson, War Crimes: A Critical Introduction, in THE LAW OF
WAR CRIMES 1, 18 (Timothy L. H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson eds., 1997).
McCormack, supranote 6, at 57 (quoting U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION,
282.
HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF

THE LAWS
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

OF WAR, at 444 (1948)).
See id. at 58.
Id.
See id. at 63.
Clark, supra note 7, at 184-85.
Id. at 187.
Id.
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F. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
AdditionalProtocols
Following the innumerable outrages perpetrated against
civilians and those caught in the chaotic destruction of World
War II, the international community sought to increase the
protections and further define the prohibitions of international
law for conduct during wartime. On August 12, 1949, the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War (Convention) was made open for signature, and by the end
of the signing period sixty-one nations had signed. 28 9
The
Convention laid out general principles regarding noncombatants, 2 90 protected persons and occupied territories, 2 9 1 the
A separate
sick and wounded, 2 92 hospitals,2 93 and others.
convention, which specifically dealt with Prisoners of War, was
2 94
promulgated at the same time.
Article 3 of the Convention prohibited the murder of noncombatants as a minimum restriction on combat actions taken by
a contracting nation. 2 93 The machine-gun execution of civilian
refugees in a tunnel 2 96 would appear to meet this minimum
threshold. The actions of U.S. forces in 1950, however, would not
be covered by the Convention protecting civilians because it did
not come into force for the United States until February 2,
1956.297
The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 were amended
by additional protocols in 1977. The addition most relevant to
this discussion is Protocol I relating to the protection of victims of
international armed conflicts. 2 98
An additional convention,
Protocol II, covers the protection of victims of non-international
armed conflicts. 2 9 9 Article 51 of Protocol I is designed to protect

289.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, opened for signature August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention].
290.
Geneva Convention, supranote 289, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518.
291.
Geneva convention, supra note 289 arts. 4, 27-51, 66-78 6 U.S.T. at
3520, 3536-50, 3558-68.
292.
Geneva Convention, supranote 289, arts. 14-17, 6 U.S.T. at 3528-30.
293.
Geneva Convention, supranote 289, arts. 18-23, 6 U.S.T. at 3530-34.
294.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
openedfor signatureAugust 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317.
295.
Geneva Convention, supranote 289, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518-20.
296.
See supranotes 80-91 and accompanying text.
297. Geneva Convention, supra note 289, 6 U.S.T. at 3695.
298.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
299.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
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civilians by limiting offensive military actions to prohibit the
intentional targeting of civilian populations and to minimize
combat operations in the vicinity of civilian habitation, cultural
objects, or individual groups of civilians.3 0 0 In addition, parties
may not attempt to use civilians to shield military objectives from
30
attack, nor use civilians to protect military operations. '
Violations of any of these provisions by one of the hostile parties
does not release3 0 2 the other from their legal obligations in the
303
protection of civilians.
G. ProtocolI & II and InternationalTribunals
The Protocols to the Geneva Convention3 0 4 established a
category of "grave breaches" and, more specifically, allowed for
individual states to determine what actions constitute additional

breaches.3 0 5 States are required to develop internal criminal laws

to deal with such circumstances, to search for those suspected of
such crimes, and to use their internal courts as a forum to try
and to sanction those individuals.3 0 6

Nations may elect to

extradite their citizens for trial to a foreign state whenever they
choose to forego prosecution themselves.3 0 7
States have
308
frequently been unwilling to prosecute suspects themselves;

300.
301.

Protocol I, supranote 298, art. 51, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
Id. art. 51(7).

The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual
civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from
military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives
from attack or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties
to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or
individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from
attacks or to shield military operations.
Id.
While not directly stated in this provision, it seems reasonable to assume that
military units may not infiltrate forces within civilian refugees in the conduct of a
"military operation," as was suggested happened during the Korean War. See
supra note 56 and accompanying text.
302. But cf. MICHAEL J. DAVIDSON, A GUIDE TO MILITARY CRIMINAL LAW 142
(1999). Davidson serves as a member of the Army Judge Advocate Generals (JAG)
Corps, and he states that under U.S. military law, "[ilt is not illegal to fire on an
enemy who is illegally using civilians as a human shield, although every effort
should be made to avoid inflicting civilian casualties. The illegal action would be
committed by the enemy force hiding behind the civilian shield, not by the unit
forced to return fire through that shield." Id.
303. Protocol I, supranote 298, art. 51(8), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27.
304.
See supranotes 298-99 and accompanying text.
305. Draper, supranote 5, at 164-69.
306. Id. at 164, 167.
307. Id.
308. Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of
InternationalLaw: A Prospectusfor Readers, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 296 (1999).
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furthermore, the historical record indicates that it is an
exceedingly rare occurrence for a state to willingly hand over its
In addition, the
citizens for other nations to prosecute. 30 9
conventions make no mention of superior orders, necessity,
duress, mistake, 3 10 good faith, drunkenness, or many other
common defenses. Even the required mens rea for many war
crimes 3 1 ' is obscure. This situation leaves nations obviously
more willing to prosecute "their own" rather than submit them to
an international body, a situation that "will prevail until an
[effective] international criminal jurisdiction" or an "international
criminal code"3 12 is established.3 13 The Convention contains no
provisions for trial before an international tribunal.3 14 It was
geared toward the prosecution of enemy prisoners of war and
their trial by the captor nation,3 1 5 a situation which is not
analogous to the No Gun Ri case.

Prosecutions for these offenses were rare until recently; domestic cases
mostly involved government prosecution of insurgents for sedition or other
acts under domestic law, but both governments and insurgencies were
generally unwilling to prosecute or punish their own personnel. Authority
to exercise universal jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes was also
uncertain; and states other than the territorial state generally abstained
from undertaking any such prosecutions. The absence of a community
desire to criminalize these acts also contributed to the opposition among
states to an international criminal court that would undertake such
prosecutions.
Id.
309.
See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
310.
Draper, supra note 5, at 165.
311.
Id. at 158.
312.
International law has developed no detailed criminal procedure either.
"Its principle thrust is that those charged with war crimes be given a fair trial in
accordance with the 'broad principles of justice and fair play which underlie all
civilized concepts of law and procedure." MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTION P.
FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR: TRANSNATIONAL COERCION & WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 721 (1994) (quoting The Justice Trial, 6 WAR CRIMES REPORT at 49
(1947)).
313.
Draper, supranote 5, at 165.
In truth, the international community, to date, has been more concerned
with expanding the content of war criminality, in the light of the
misbehavior of State agencies in time of war, than with working out the
substantive ingredients of those criminal acts in such matters as the
mental element and the prohibited act. Nor has it paid much attention to
the substantive defenses. We lack a mature and complete system of
international penal law, particularly in the part of it governing war
criminality.
Id. at 158.
314.
McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 312, at 731.
315.
Id. at 730. "The forum, general procedure, and penalties in war crimes
trials of enemy prisoners of war must be that to which the armed forces of the
captor are subject under its military law." Id.
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Finding that U.S. forces violated provisions of the Convention
and related protocols would be possible, but bringing a
prosecution in an international tribunal would be highly
problematic. Some have argued in analogous situations that only
U.S. military law would apply,3 16 rather than any international
strictures or conventions. 31 7 Furthermore, it seems very unlikely
that the United States would allow any such body jurisdiction
over its citizens,3 1 8 because it is not a signatory to either of the
3 19
protocols.
V. Is THERE A DEFENSE OF "SUPERIOR ORDERS?"
United States, as well as international law, has generally
been unwilling to allow individuals to avoid responsibility for war
crimes by offering the excuse that they were simply following
superior orders. 3 20 In addition, precedent has been established
finding commanders liable for the "grave breaches" committed by
32 1
their subordinates and forces they command.

316. Taylor, supra note 2, at 372. "In Vietnam, where the American forces
are operating primarily on the territory of a presumptive ally (South Vietnam), the
question whether or not the laws of war [and the Geneva Convention of 1949] are
applicable to a given situation may present considerable difficulties." Id. This
quotation was obviously written during the United States' involvement in the
Vietnam War, but circumstances during the Korean War are sufficiently analogous
for this statement to suggest similar concerns about the applicability of
international law to the No Gun Ri incident.
317. MG George S. Prugh, then Army Judge Advocate General, is quoted
regarding the crimes committed at My Lai, "the victims were citizens of an allied
nation" [as were the South Korean refugees at No Gun Ri) "not enemies protected
under the Geneva Conventions, but citizens protected by the law of Vietnam ...
Within the scope of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the My Lai murders were
not legally distinguishable from other homicides" and as such were crimes but not
war crimes amenable to jurisdiction outside the U.S. or the its allied country. See
SOLIS, supra note 19, at 57. Under the customary law of war and the Nuremberg
Principles, however, the Army itself found My Lai to be "not only crimes by any
domestic definition, but also war crimes-grave breaches of the law of war." Id. at
58.
318. Paul Richter, Deal Weighed in Korean War Slaying Probe, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 1999, at Al. "The United States last year declined to join a proposed new
international criminal court that would have had jurisdiction over war crimes.'
Id.
319. Id.
320. See infra notes 322-36 and accompanying text.
321. See infra notes 337-63 and accompanying text.
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A. The Individuals Who FiredInto the Tunnels at No Gun
Ri Have Claimed that they Were Following Orders
to Do So. What Effect Does this Claim Have on
322

the Determinationof their Legal Guilt?

The No Gun Ri veterans allegedly received orders to engage
the refugees huddled under the railroad bridge pursuant to a
policy that originated at higher headquarters.3 2 3 The current
version of the U.S. Army's Law of War does not recognize the
superior orders argument3 2 4 to be an absolute defense to a war
crime charge.3 2 5 American military rules have long held that "it
is the soldier's duty to obey lawfd orders, but that he may
disobey-and indeed must, under some circumstances-unlawful
orders."3 26 Gen. Telford Taylor, Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg,
recognized the difficulty that this principle establishes in practice.
He noted that, under the pressures of war, subordinates are often
in no position to determine the legality of the order, and
furthermore, those same pressures inherently require prompt
obedience with little time for contemplation.3 2 7 An examination
of the decisions of the tribunals following World War II indicate
that they often accepted this type of rationale for subordinates
arguing the defense of superior orders.3 2 8 The Chief Prosecutor
believed that a defense of superior orders creates two distinct
paths of analysis: first, a defense based on lack of knowledge, and
second, a factor in mitigation based on fear.3 2 9 Clearly "[slome
orders are so atrocious, or plainly unlawful, that the subordinate
must know" that they are unlawful.3 3 0 Situations, however, often

322. This note will not address the possible defense of military necessity. It
seems to this author that any such claim would be highly unlikely to succeed, and
it would put the defendants in the distasteful position of arguing that their
intentional killing of civilians was somehow justified by a greater military purpose.
International law does not generally support this type of claim. For a discussion
of the concept of military necessity, see McDoUGAL & FELICANO supra note 312, at
520-42.
323.
See supranotes 65-68, 81-83 and accompanying text.
324.
See McDOUGAL & FELICANO, supra note 312, at 691. "It may be noted
that the term 'superior' has been interpreted to embrace in reference not only
formal rank and authority but also effective physical or moral capacity to induce
commission of an unlawful act." Id.
325.
See supranotes 221-22 and accompanying text.
326.
Taylor, supranote 213, at 381.
327.
Id. at 382.
328.
McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 312, at 691. "Examination of the
decisions of the war crimes tribunals indicates that by and large the plea of
superior orders was assessed in the light of familiar criminal law principles
relating to mens rea as a basic condition of penal responsibility. Thus, where the
court was satisfied that the accused did not in fact know of the illegal quality of
the order he executed, he was not held accountable." Id.
329. Taylor, supra note 213, at 384.
330.
Id.
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do not allow for such certainty, and a lack of knowledge should,
therefore, be allowed as a defense. 3 3 1 Additionally, there may be
cases in which the subordinate may believe that the orders are
illegal but is threatened if he does not comply by his superior.
Taylor believed that compliance under this type of duress might
be a mitigating circumstance.3 3 2 His opinion apparently found
expression in the Army's 1956 field manual, which attempts to
allow military courts the discretion to take knowledge3 3 3 and fear
into account in war crime prosecutions.3 3 4 The Army's policy
regarding the defense of superior orders prompted one
commentator to remark that, "It would appear that American
soldiers have little to fear at home for prosecution for war crimes
committed while following superior orders." 33 5 Given the chaotic
nature of the situation at No Gun Ri, as well as the difficulty in

331. Id. at 385.
332. Id.
333. See United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1183 (A.C.M.R. 1973).
Speaking in the review of the prosecution of 1LT William Calley, of My Lai infamy,
the U.S. Army Court of Military Review said:
[t]he law takes these factors into account in assessing criminal
responsibility for acts done in compliance with illegal orders. The acts of a
subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful order given him by his
superior are excused and impose no criminal liability upon him unless the
superior's order is one which a man of ordinary sense and understanding
would, under the circumstances, know to be unlawful, or if the order in
question is actually known to the accused to be unlawful.
Id.
334.

Taylor, supra note 213, at 385 (quoting FM 27-10, THE LAW OF
509: Defense of SuperiorOrders):

WARFARE, at 182,

509 (a). The fact that the law of war has been violated pursuant to
an order of a superior authority, whether military or civil, does not deprive
the act in question of its character of a war crime, nor does it constitute a
defense in the trial of an accused individual, unless he did not know and
could not reasonably have been expected to know that the act ordered was
unlawful. In all cases where the order is held not to constitute a defense to
an allegation of a war crime, the fact that the individual was acting
pursuant to orders may be considered in mitigation of punishment
(emphasis added).
b). In considering the question whether a superior order constitutes
a valid defense, the court shall take into consideration the fact that
obedience to lawful military orders is the duty of every member of the
armed forces; that the latter cannot be expected, in conditions of war
discipline, to weigh scrupulously the legal merits of the orders
received; ... At the same time it must be borne in mind that members of
the armed forces are bound to obey only lawful orders.
Id.
WELLS, supra note 203, at 124. "The question of superior orders was
335.
sufficiently unanswered that the attempt to conduct a trial of those involved in
Son My and My Lai foundered, less from lack of evidence than from lack of
diligence in holding soldiers responsible both for orders given and orders
received." Id. at 123.
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establishing exactly who gave or received any orders to fire upon
the civilians,3 3 6 it appears likely that the exceptions laid out in
the Army's manual would offer veterans a successful defense, or
some mitigation of their responsibility.
B. How Responsible are those that Gave the Orders?
International and U.S. laws of war hold military commanders
to a higher standard of accountability for the conduct of their
337
The
subordinates than they do the subordinates themselves.
savage war in the Pacific during the final months of World War II
is in many ways responsible for the pivotal case in American, as
well as international, jurisprudence regarding a commander's
liability for the actions taken by forces under his command. The
trial by military commission of the Japanese General Tomoyuld
Yamashita in 1945 found that he had:
unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as
commander to control the operations of the members of his
command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other
high crimes against people of the United States and its allies and
dependencies, particularly the Philippines; and he thereby violated
338
the laws of war.

The commission found that commanders owe "an affirmative duty
to take such measures [as] appropriate [to] protect prisoners of
war and the civilian population"3 3 9 and that such a purpose
would be defeated if a commander could neglect to "take
reasonable measures for their protection.",34 Furthermore, in the
absence of such measures, "a commander may be held
34 1
responsible, even criminally liable, for the [acts] of his troops."
The Supreme Court let the military commission's finding
stand, 34 2 and held that the defendant's guarantee of due process
was not violated by the lack of procedural safeguards, improper
rules of evidence, and the quasi-judicial nature of the body
established by fiat by General MacArthur.3 43 This holding met
withering criticism from two of the Justices, not only because of

See supra notes 65-91 and accompanying text.
336.
DAVIDSON, supra note 302, at 150.
337.
Yamashitav. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 13-14 (U.S. 1946).
338.
Id. at 16.
339.
Id. at 15.
340.
Id. at 24 n.10.
341.
A recent fictionalization of the initial occupation of Japan and the
342.
leadership of the Supreme Commander Gen. Douglas MacArthur has examined
the Yamashita trial and set it as the centerpiece of the novel. See generally JAMES
WEBB, THE EMPEROR'S GENERAL (1999). The author categorized it as a miscarriage
of justice, and as the exercise of the victor's power rather than law. Id.
Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 25.
343.
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the due process issue, 3 44 but also because of the dangerous
nature of the command responsibility precedent itself.3 4 S In

Justice Murphy's stinging dissent he said:
He was not charged with personally participating in the acts of
atrocity or with ordering or condoning their commission. Not even
knowledge of these crimes was attributed to him. It was simply
alleged that he unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his
duty as commander to control the operations of the members of his
command, permitting them to commit the acts of atrocity. The
recorded annals of warfare and the established principles of
international law afford not the slightest precedent for such a
charge. This indictment in effect permitted the military commission
to make the crime whatever it willed, dependent upon its biased
view as to petitioner's duties and his disregard thereof, a practice
reminiscent of that pursued in certain less respected nations in
346
recent years.
In other words, read against the background of military events in
the Philippines subsequent to October 9, 1944, these charges
amount to this: We the victorious American forces, have done
everything possible to destroy and disorganize your lines of
communication, your effective control of your personnel, your
ability to wage war. In those respects we have succeeded. We have
And now we charge and
defeated and crushed your forces.
condemn you for having been inefficient in maintaining control of
your troops during the period when we were so effectively besieging
and eliminating your forces and blocking your ability to maintain
effective control. Many terrible atrocities were committed by your
disorganized troops. Because these atrocities were so widespread
we will not bother to charge or prove that you committed, ordered
or condoned any of them. We will assume that they must have
resulted from your inefficiency and negligence as a commander. In
short, we charge you with the crime of inefficiency in controlling
your troops.
We will judge the discharge of your duties by the
disorganization, which we ourselves created in large part. Our
3 47
standards ofjudgment are whatever we wish to make them.

Justice Rutledge quoted Thomas Paine in warning of the
danger that this case established when he stated, "He that would
make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from
oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent
that will reach to himself."3 48 Some have claimed that this

344.
Id. at 27-28 (Murphy, J., dissenting). "No military necessity or other
emergency demanded the suspension of the safeguards of due process. Yet
petitioner was rushed to trial under an improper charge, given insufficient time to
prepare an adequate defense, deprived of the benefits of some of the most
elementary rules of evidence and summarily sentenced to be hanged." Id.
345.
Id. at 26 (Murphy, J., dissenting), 41 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
346.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 34-35.
347.
348.
Id. at 81 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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doctrine has been repudiated as unjust in international law.3 4 9
The prosecutions of suspected war criminals in the Yugoslav War,
Crimes Tribunal, however, indicate that the Yamashita doctrine
may be alive and well:
The fact that any of the [war crimes were] committed by a
subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility
if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about
to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to
punish the perpetrators thereof.3 5 0

On March 3, 2000, a Croatian General, Tihomir Blaskic, was
sentenced to forty-five years imprisonment for war crimes that
occurred during the 1992-1995 Bosnian conflict. 35 1 The Tribunal
found Blaskic liable for superior responsibility pursuant to Article
7(3), holding:
That if a commander lacks knowledge that crimes are about to be
or have been committed, such lack of knowledge must be held
against him, when it is the result of negligence in the discharge of
his duties, taking into account his particular position of command
352
and the circumstances prevailing at the time.

Those circumstances are apparently quite subjective because the
court rejected claims made by Blaskic that the communications
difficulties and breaks in the chain of command prevented him
from being aware of war crimes being committed. 35 3
The U.S. Army doctrine is pretty clear as to the degree of
culpability commanders assume for acts of their subordinates.
Paragraph 501 of the Law of Land Warfare, 1956, says "[Mlilitary
commanders may be responsible for war crimes committed by
subordinate members . . . responsibility may rest not only with
the actual perpetrators but also with the commander . . . The
commander is also responsible if he has actual knowledge, or
should have knowledge, through reports received by him or

349.
Simpson, supra note 281, at 14.
'On the other hand, General
Yamashita was tried and hanged on a doctrine of command responsibility that has
since been repudiated because of the injustice of convicting an individual for
crimes they did not, and could not, know were being carried out by their
subordinates." Id.
350.
Statute for the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal in Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph2 of Security Counsel Resolution 808
(1993), art. 7(3), U.N. Doc. S/25704, 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1175.
351.
Anne Swardson, Croatian GeneralGets 45 Years for War Crimes, WASH.
POST, Mar. 4, 2000 at All.
352.
Press Release, The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, GeneralBlaskic Found Guilty on All Chargesand Sentenced to 45 Years
Imprisonment (JL/P.I.S./474-E Chambre De 16re Instance) (Mar. 3, 2000)
available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p474-e.htm.
353.
Swardson, supra note 351, at All.
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through other means." 35 4 This statement sounds very similar to
3S S
the Yamashita rule.
There appears, however, to be another standard that has at
least once been followed by U.S. military courts. CPT Ernest
Medina was charged with involuntary manslaughter3 5 6 for failing
to control his company, which included Lieutenant Calley's
platoon,3 5 7 during the My Lai massacre.3 5 8
Accepting the
Yamashita standard, as well as the The Law of Land Warfare, the
military judge nevertheless gave the jury an instruction
stipulating that the panel could only find Medina guilty if he
"possessed actual knowledge of the atrocities and failed to act."3 5 9
Evidence demonstrated that Medina was in the vicinity of My
Lai3 60 and in constant radio contact with his soldiers, however he
was ultimately acquitted on the basis that he had no actual
3 61
knowledge of the massacre being committed by his men.
Most of the senior officers responsible for the alleged orders
given at No Gun Ri3 62 or those that gave the documented orders
3 63
not to allow refugees to move through their area of operations
are now long dead. The absence of these commanders, the
paucity of evidence connecting them to the events at No Gun Ri,
the general chaotic nature of the front during the first weeks of
the Korean War, and the irregular application of the Yamashita
standard of command responsibility in actual practice would
combine to make the possibility of obtaining a successful
conviction of commanders for the actions of Company H
extremely tenuous. It, therefore, seems unlikely that the United
States would bring, or allow another national or international
body to bring, charges based on a theory of command
responsibility against any senior officers for the shootings at No
Gun Ri.

354.
RICHARD HAMMER, THE COURT-MARTIAL OF LT. CALLEY 14-15 (1971)
(quoting The Law of Land Warfare, 1956).
355.
See supra notes 338-41, 345 and accompanying text.
356.
For a journalistic account of the 1971 court-martial, see generally
MARY MCCARTHY, MEDINA (1972); in addition to the charge that his men
premeditatedly committed murder at My Lai, the Captain was also charged with
personally shooting a woman, shooting a child, and two counts of assaulting a
prisoner with a rifle. Id. at 3.
357.
See supranote 14 and accompanying text.
358.
DAVIDSON, supranote 302, at 151.
359. Id.
360.
MCCARTHY, supra note 356, at 30-31.
361.
DAVIDSON, supranote 302, at 151.
362.
Thompson, supranote 84, at 42.
363.
See supranotes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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VI. IF THE ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION
DETERMINES THAT WAR CRIMES WERE COMMITTED AT
No GUN RI, WHAT ACTIONS SHOULD THE
UNITED STATES TAKE?
3 64
it
Given the evidence that is already in the public domain,
appears quite likely that the Army Inspector General's team will
determine that U.S. soldiers killed civilians at No Gun Ri. The
question that such a determination would raise is: Were these,
killings a war crime? Assuming that they could be so described,
the U.S. government would face at least two more questions
requiring an answer. First, would prosecution by a U.S. military
court or an international tribunal be in order? Second, and
independent of the criminal decision, should the U.S. government
consider paying reparations for this incident?

A. Should the United States Try the 2/7 Cavalry
Veterans or ConsiderAllowing an International
Tribunal to Try thernfor the Deaths of the Korean
CiviliansKilled Under the RailroadBridge
at No Gun Ri?
Political opinion in the United States is sharply divided
regarding what actions the government should take against
anyone found to have been responsible for war crimes at No Gun
Ri. Some in the government are considering offering blanket
immunity in the hopes of encouraging witnesses to come forward
and allowing investigators to develop as full a record as
possible.3 6 5 Some, including a former U.S. ambassador to South
Korea, believe that the Koreans would not object to such a grant
provided that it was not used to create an obstacle to a full
accounting of the events.3 6 6 On the other hand, some argue that
it is unlikely that the U.S. and South Korean governments can be
trusted to get to the bottom of the massacre.3 67 The Cleveland
PlainDealerargued that what is "needed is an international truth

364.
See supra notes 57-93 and accompanying text.
365.
Korean War Killing Inquiry, supranote 95, at Foreign Pages 17.
366.
Richter, supra note 118, Al.
"Donald P. Gregg, a former U.S.
ambassador to South Korea who is chairman of the Korea Society in New York,
said he believes that South Koreans would not object to an immunity 'as long as it
is not perceived as sheltering anybody from retribution." Id.
367.
The FalloutFrom No Gun Ri; Should the U.S. Apologize for Korean War
Casualties?,CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 21, 1999, at 4G. "While possible, it is
unlikely that the U.S. and South Korean governments will give an honest
disclosure of the massacre. It would be too politically humiliating for the United
States to admit that its troops committed war crimes, particularly since the
massacre at No Gun Ri does not seem to be an isolated event." Id.

982

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33:933

commission modeled after the commissions that have investigated
massacres in Africa, Latin America and Europe." 3 68 A former
Secretary of the Navy, James Webb, argued in the Wall Street
Journal against making revisionist moral judgements half a
century after the fact, rather the United States should accept that
civilians are inevitable casualties in high intensity combat.3 6 9
The problem of military units operating in and around
civilians and built-up areas is not an academic matter for the
U.S. military, but rather one that has been faced on numerous
occasions in the last decade, from Somalia to Haiti and into
Bosnia and Kosovo. 3 70 The military has been aggressive in
training its units in the Rules of Engagement,3 7 1 and prosecuting

368. Id.
369. James Webb, Editorial, The Bridge at No Gun R4 WALL ST. J., Oct. 6,
1999, at A22. Discussing the orders not to allow refugees through the American
lines, Secretary Webb says:
Such orders, excised from the chaos that created their necessity, fall
heavily on the minds and consciences of those who have never been called
upon to make the Hobson's choice of combat: Do I protect my men and
lose my innocence? Or do I keep my innocence and lose my men? This
thin unbreachable line separates those who went to war from those who
stayed behind. America is a lovely place to have such debates as we sit in
brightly lit offices next to our computers under the whir of air conditioners
and HEPA filters and sip on herbal tea or Snapple. What is a war crime?
On whom shall we pass judgment as we peer back through the mists of
history? Were civilians killed? Is that enough for condemnation? What
standard shall we in our wisdom erect for those who had little hope of even
seeing tomorrow when the world turned suddenly ugly and they pressed
their faces far into the dirt while mortars twirled overhead and the bullets
kicked up dust spots near their eyes?... Is deliberately killing a civilian a
war crime? It certainly wasn't when we fire-bombed Dresden and Tokyo,
taking hundreds of thousands of lives in the name of 'breaking the enemy's
will to fight.' Perhaps the greatest anomaly of recent times is that death
delivered by a bomb earns one an air medal, while when it comes at the
end of a gun it earns one a trip to jail.
Id.
Finally Secretary Webb, a Marine combat veteran of Vietnam concludes, "One
hopes for a greater sense of wisdom as the facts are assessed and judgments are
made. Otherwise, the only lessons seem to be: Make sure you fight in a popular
war. Make sure you use bombs instead of bullets. And make sure you win.' Id.
370. Serving in the military the author can testify to the emphasis placed on
Force Protection (preventing terrorist and other attacks against U.S. forces
deployed in foreign countries) as well as knowing and enforcing the Rules of
Engagement (ROE). For a greater discussion of the ROE, see generally Major
Mark S. Martins, Rules of Engagementfor Land Forces: A Matter of Training,Not
Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1994).
371. The ROE in a general sense define when a soldier may and may not
engage a suspected enemy or unidentified individual. The ROE can be adjusted
based on intelligence assessments of the current threat, past incidents, and other
factors.
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those that violate the Rules without good cause.3 7 2 Without a
doubt the military leadership has a duty, as well as a concern,
that they not send the wrong message to the soldiers on active
duty by treating those accused in the No Gun Ri too casually.
Legally the Pentagon may have the right to prosecute those
retired veterans who may be responsible for the killing of the
Korean civilians. Legal distinctions, however, do not answer the
3 73
fairness questions that have been, and are certain to be raised.
Investigations of fratricide offer an interesting parallel to this
situation.3 7 4 One such incident during the Allied invasion of
3 75
Sicily resulted in the deaths of more than 300 paratroopers.
The commanding general of the victimized 82nd Airborne
Division, Matthew Ridgway, concluded that an attempt to fix
responsibility "would be difficult, cause finger pointing among
those potentially responsible, and would prove to be of
questionable value. He concluded that they should learn from
mistakes made and accept the casualties as the 'inevitable price
of war in human life. 1376
Certainly the Inspector General should fully investigate the
incident and present a full report, which can be expected not to
be very flattering towards the United States. Such a report is
necessary for domestic, as well as international, political reasons,
and morally required for accountability. The few veterans that

372.

See Martins, supra note 370, at 17-18 (discussing a

case from

Somalia).
373.
Korean War Killing Inquiry, supra note 95, at 17. "The inquiry would
address the protests of veterans' groups that it would be unfair to punish former
soldiers for an incident that occurred half a century ago." Id.
374.
DAVIDSON, supra note 302, at 136-37. As a recent example of a
fratricide investigation, Davidson discusses the downing of two U.S. Army Black
Hawk helicopters by U.S. Air Force F-15's enforcing the no-fly zone in Iraq on April
14, 1994. Id. The investigation focused on the AWACS monitoring plane, which
should have controlled the airspace and averted the disaster:
The air force's efforts to hold the F-15 pilot and AWACS crew criminally
responsible for the deaths met severe criticism. The disciplinary efforts
adversely affected the morale of other AWACS crews and generated charges
that the airmen were merely scapegoats to cover up larger, systemic problems.
When charges were dropped against the F-15 pilot but not against Wang [the
officer in charge of the AWACS] many questioned why Wang alone was facing
charges. Members of the AWACS community questioned whether the charging
decision reflected an institutional bias in favor of fighter pilots. Ultimately,
Wang's acquittal satisfied few and touched off a torrent of criticism that
effectively branded the entire military justice system a failure... [and led to
numerous outside investigations].... As history has shown, except in cases of
clear-cut, individualized gross negligence, friendly fire incidents will remain
difficult to successfully prosecute and overzealous pursuit of justice following
such incidents may cause more harm than good.
Id.
375.
376.

See id. at 135-36.
Id. at 136.
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could be charged should be granted immunity to assist in the
investigation and removed from the inherent and legitimate
concerns over fairness that such a selective prosecution would
entail.
B. Can a Case be Made for Reparations to the
Survivors of the Massacre?
There is a tradition in international law that nations may
make payments to other nations for damages done to that state's
citizens, but such payments are made to the other nation itself
and not directly to the injured parties.3 77 The usual form of such
payments is ex gratia-implying no legal obligation, but rather
made "as a humanitarian or diplomatic gesture."3 7 8
Such a
payment may be distributed by the recipient nation in whatever
manner it sees fit,3 7 9 implicitly recognizing the difficulty
associated with identifying the proper beneficiaries.3 8 0
In this case there are many veterans who are adamantly
opposed to any discussion of monetary compensation for the
victims of No Gun Ri. 3 8 1 Since the No Gun Ri investigation began
the South Korean Defense Ministry has received petitions for
compensation relating to thirty-seven new and previously
uninvestigated alleged massacres.3 8 2
Both North and South
Korean civilian casualties from the three-year long conflict have
been estimated at two million.3 8 3 Certainly the great majority of
these deaths would not lead to claims for compensation, but the
vast numbers suggest the danger of such a prediction if

377. Harold G. Maier, Agora: The Downing of Iran Air Flight 655: Ex Gratia
Payments & the IranianAirline Tragedy, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 325, 326 (1989).
378. Id. at 325.
379. Id. at 326.
380. Aviam Soifer, Redress, Progress & the Benchmark Problem, 19 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 525, 527 (1998). "To right past wrongs and to make victims, or
the descendants of victims, whole again is deeply problematic for many reasons.
Not the least of these is the impossibility of defining a baseline and holding to it,
as if it were flash frozen, throughout subsequent changes." Id.
381. Dobbs, supranote 57.
Few of the 7th Cav veterans believe the Korean survivors are entitled
to monetary compensation. Amounts of up to $150,000 have been
suggested by the Korean side. To compensate a country where you lost
40,000 of your own men is nonsense,' says Herman Patterson. 'ho
compensated me? Nobody.' 'I don't think the Koreans deserve any
compensation,' agrees Kerns. 'If I had been killed over there, my parents
would have gotten $10,000. Civilians are going to suffer in any war. I
haven't noticed many South Koreans wanting to go and live in North
Korea. They got a free country, thanks to us.
Id.
382.

Sang-Hun Choe, supra note 74, at A20.

383.

BLAIR, supra note 23, at 975.

2000]

PROSECUTING THE "FOGOF WAR?"

precedence for recompense is established.
Concerns with an
unending stream of claims for reparation resulted in a bar to
such claims in the peace treaty the United States signed with
Japan.3 84 For example, American POWs forced to serve as slave
laborers for various Japanese industries during their internment
have been frustrated in their attempts for any remuneration as a
result of that agreement.3 85
Although from an individual
subjective perspective such a result seems inequitable, it does
seem to allow for a bright-line certainty at the macro-level and
thereby may serve justifiable public policy concerns.
Ultimately, what many of the survivors are seeking is an
3 86
admission and apology rather than monetary compensation.
South Korean government ministers have said that the Korean
people recognize the sacrifice that the United States has made in
ensuring their freedom and that a full accounting would not
change, but rather would enhance, the integrity of the two
countries in public opinion.3 8 7 An apology will obviously not
satisfy everyone, but the payment of compensation could open a
Pandora's box with little to limit where the fates could scatter the
results. Therefore, the Korean government may be best served by
a full accounting, with an official apology supplemented by those
veterans who are willing to do so, and no monetary
compensation.
VII. CONCLUSION
This note has examined the terrible events that occurred in
one small hamlet during the American Army's initial attempts to
stem the invading North Korean tide in the first days of the
Korean War. All that have been willing to discuss the events at
the No Gun Ri Bridge are in agreement that something
calamitous happened. The bullet scared walls of the tunnels have
stood in mute silence to this fact for half a century. That poor
judgment was exercised appears to be without question. That

384.

Doug Struck & Kathryn Tolbert, U.S. Envoy Rejects POW's Lawsuits

Against Japan,INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIB., Jan. 18, 2000, at A5.

385.
386.

Id.
Sang-Hun Choe, S. Korea Seeks U.S. Help in No Gun Ri Probe, THE
SUNDAY GAZETTE MAIL, Oct. 3, 1999, at A17.
387.
Kim Yong Geun, A Korean's View of No Gun R4 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Dec. 21, 1999, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/
1999/10/06/text/pSs3.html. Mr. Geun is the director of the South Korean
Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy; Struck, supra note 107, at 6 ("[t]he
South Korean Foreign Affairs Minister, Hong Soon Young, said in an interview: We
don't want to lose sight of the fact that the U.S. was here to defend human rights
and they were here at the invitation of my government and people.").
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Korean civilians were intentionally killed in a premeditated
massacre seems definitively less certain.
American precedence allows the military justice system the
right to court-martial those veterans that retired after a full
military career for their involvement in the killings.
That a
prosecution for murder under the Articles of War would result in
a conviction seems less certain. Clearly, arguments could be
advanced by No Gun Ri veterans suggesting that the superior
orders they received constitute a complete defense to the charges,
or at the very least a mitigating factor in the consideration of any
punishment. U.S. policy, as well as a review of the historical
record, make it highly unlikely that these veterans need concern
themselves over a prosecution by a foreign nation or an
international tribunal.
The American military has taken great strides in its training,
its investigation of possible war crimes, and its use of the Rules of
Engagement. These changes have made it extremely unlikely that
today's professional and volunteer military would allow another
No Gun Ri to occur, or in the unlikely event of such a massacre
for it to escape detection for such a lengthy period of time.
Nevertheless, to preserve an example for the modern military, as
well as to meet its domestic and international obligations, the
military investigation should have some identifiable purpose and
goal. A full accounting of what happened, why it happened, and
how to prevent a future occurrence of such an incident is the
least that America and her allies can expect from the Inspector
General's team.
That reparations should be considered, but
ultimately rejected, seems a necessary policy decision as well.
Ultimately an apology for this terrible, but unfortunately not
always uncommon, incident of war seems advisable.
Seeking
prosecutions, however, would unjustly magnify the tragedy, and
would truly be a prosecution of the "fog of war."
ChristopherD. Booth
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